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Strictly speaking, Judaism is not a religion at all but simply 
the union of a number of individuals who, since they 
belonged to a particular stock, established themselves into a 
community under purely political laws, hence not into a 
church.… We cannot, therefore, begin the universal history 
of the Church … anywhere but from the origin of 
Christianity, which, as a total abandonment of the Judaism 
in which it originated, grounded an entirely new principle, 
effected a total revolution in doctrines of faith.… The 
subsequent discarding of the corporeal sign which served 
wholly to separate this people from others is itself warrant 
for the judgment that the new faith, not bound to the statutes 
of the old, nor, indeed, to any statute at all, was to contain a 
religion valid for the world and not for one single people. 
— Immanuel Kant, Religion within the Boundaries of 
Mere Reason (1793)1	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1. IMMANUEL KANT, RELIGION WITHIN THE BOUNDARIES OF MERE REASON 
AND OTHER WRITINGS 130, 132 (Allen Wood and George di Giovanni eds., 1998) 
(hereinafter “KANT, RELIGION”). 
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         INTRODUCTION 
Two ideas shape the structure and logic of contemporary 
religious freedom discourse: first, that the state should be neutral 
towards religion;2 and second, that religious freedom is a universal 
human right which guarantees both the individual and collective right 
to freedom of religion, conscience, and belief.3 These two concepts 
animate equally constitutional and international law on religious 
liberty and can be traced in the jurisprudence of a large number of 
national and international courts. In any jurisdiction in which they are 
invoked, neutrality and the right thus become essentially-contested 
questions for the parties and adjudicators alike and, by extension, 
raise deeper anxieties about our contemporary conditions of 
secularity and freedom. 
 
2. In First Amendment jurisprudence, see, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 
U.S. 97, 103‒04 (1968) (“Government in our democracy, state and national, must 
be neutral in matters of religious theory, doctrine, and practice. It may not be 
hostile to any religion or to the advocacy of no‒religion, and it may not aid, foster, 
or promote one religion or religious theory against another or even against the 
militant opposite. The First Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between 
religion and religion, and between religion and nonreligion.”). In European Court 
of Human Rights jurisprudence, see, e.g., the recent judgment of the Grand 
Chamber in Lautsi v. Italy, 54 Eur. Ct. H.R. 3, ¶ 60 (2011) (noting that Article 9 of 
the ECHR “guarantees freedom of thought, conscience and religion, including the 
freedom not to belong to a religion, and … imposes on Contracting States a ‘duty 
of neutrality and impartiality’” and further, citing Leyla Şahin v. Turkey [GC], no. 
44774/98, § 107, ECHR 2005‒XI, that “States have responsibility for ensuring, 
neutrally and impartially, the exercise of various religions, faiths and beliefs 
[including] …. relations between believers and non‒believers and relations between 
the adherents of various religions, faiths and beliefs.”). 
3. Universal Declaration of Human Rights art 18, G.A. Res. 217 A (III), U.N. 
GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948); International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 18, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms art. 9 (opened for signature by the Council of Europe on Nov. 4, 1959, 
entered into force Sept. 3, 1953). See also OFFICE OF INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, 
BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS & LABOR, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: AN 
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, FACT SHEET, April 16, 2001 (“Religious freedom 
has always been at the core of American life and public policy. It is the first of the 
freedoms enumerated in the Bill of Rights — a reflection of the founders’ belief 
that freedom of religion and conscience is the cornerstone of liberty. Freedom of 
religion and conscience, however, is not an American invention. Indeed, as 
recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, religious liberty and 
other universal rights are not ‘granted’ by any state or society.”). 
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Prima facie, the reasoning in R (on the application of E) v. The 
Governing Body of JFS (the “Jews Free School” or “JFS” case)4 does 
not concern religious freedom. Rather, the judgments are framed 
according to the principles and logic of antidiscrimination and 
equality law which seek to guarantee the fair treatment of all parties. 
As this Article argues, however, the dialectic between secular 
neutrality and subjective freedom is evident in the legal reasoning 
which seeks to achieve neutrality of treatment through an 
unarticulated conceptualization of religion latent in the distinction 
between racial and religious grounds of discrimination. The case thus 
provides a powerful illustration of how in practice secular power in 
the liberal state assumes a non-neutral position and actively 
intervenes in religious institutional practice to delimit the sphere of 
religious influence.5 In particular, two themes emerge from the 
judgments discussed below. 
First, the right to religious liberty can be seen to encode a 
conception of the essential nature of religion understood in creedal 
terms as interiorized conscience or belief viewed as freely chosen, i.e. 
as a “set of beliefs in a set of propositions (about transcendence, 
causality, cosmology) to which an individual gives assent”.6 This 
conception of religion “emphasizes the priority of belief as a state of 
mind rather than as constituting activity in the world.”7 
Second and closely related, both the subject of the right and the 
scope of freedom it protects are indeterminate categories which 
inescapably entangle conceptions of the religious and the secular.8 It 
is the autonomous subject who is the (universal) bearer of the right to 
religious liberty while the freedom protected by the right is divided 
into two spheres: an internal, sovereign realm of absolute freedom of 
 
4. [2009] UKSC 15, [2010] 2 A.C. 728 (S.C.) (appeal taken from Eng.) 
[hereinafter JFS]. 
5. Hussein Ali Agrama, Secularism, Sovereignty, Indeterminacy: Is Egypt a 
Secular or Religious State? 52 COMP. STUD. SOC’Y & HIST. 495, 499 (2010). Much 
recent critical scholarship on the nature of secularism thus emphasizes that it 
“involves less a separation of religion and politics than the fashioning of religion as 
an object of continual management and intervention, and the shaping of religious 
life and sensibility to fit the presuppositions and ongoing requirements of liberal 
governance.” Id. 
6. Saba Mahmood, Can Secularism Be Other‒wise?, in VARIETIES OF 
SECULARISM IN A SECULAR AGE 283 (Michael Warner, Jonathan VanAntwerpen 
and Craig J. Calhoun eds., 2010).  
7. TALAL ASAD, GENEALOGIES OF RELIGION: DISCIPLINE AND REASONS OF 
POWER IN CHRISTIANITY AND ISLAM 47 (1993). 
8. Cf. Agrama, supra note 5, at 502.  
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conscience or belief and an external realm of manifestation of 
conscience or belief which is subject to state limitation and 
regulation. 
The JFS case demonstrates that these categories are vigorously 
contested by contemporary religious traditions in their meaning, 
scope, genealogy and everyday practice. As a matter of history and 
theory, rival intellectual traditions and normative conflicts are 
internal to the question of the right to religious liberty itself. This 
suggests that religious freedom is not a single, stable principle 
situated outside of culture, spatial geographies, or power relations but 
is rather a fractious, polyvalent concept unfolding through particular 
histories in differing national and international normative orders.9 
This Article illustrates these propositions by analyzing the 
reasoning in the majority, concurring, and dissenting judgments 
respectively. What emerges from the tripartite sequence of opinions 
is a complex, but familiar picture: the statutory scheme comprised by 
the Race Relations Act 1976 (“RRA 1976,”)10 later consolidated and 
revised in the Equality Act 2010,11 in conjunction with judicial 
interpretation of these provisions, is premised on distinct conceptions 
of both religion and the right to religious freedom. 
The argument proceeds in two parts. Part I begins by analyzing 
the majority’s finding of direct ethnic discrimination by JFS in 
excluding M on the basis of two critical distinctions: first, between 
racial (Section A) and religious discrimination (Section B) and 
second, between the “grounds” for such discrimination on the one 
hand and the “reasons” or “motives” for it on the other (Section C). 
The Article argues that these two distinctions encode a distinctly 
modern and Christian conception of religion and religious 
subjectivity which is deeply incompatible both conceptually and 
historically with Judaism as a religion (Section D).  
Part II then considers the conflicts of value that arise internal to 
the right by examining the disagreements first, between the majority 
on the one hand and concurring and dissenting judgments on the 
other regarding the relationship between direct racial discrimination 
 
9. Peter Danchin, Islam in the Secular Nomos of the European Court of 
Human Rights, 32 MICH. J. INT’L L. 663, 746 (2011); Saba Mahmood & Peter G. 
Danchin, Politics of Religious Freedom: Contested Genealogies, 113 SOUTH ATL. 
Q. 1 (2014).  
10. Race Relations Act, 1976, c. 74 (U.K.), amended by Race Relations Act, 
2000, c. 34 (U.K.), repealed by Equality Act, 2010, c. 15 (U.K.). 
11.  Equality Act, 2010, c. 15 (U.K.). 
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and the right to religious freedom as encoded in the distinction 
between racial and religious grounds for exclusion (Section A); and 
second, having found JFS’s ground for exclusion to be religious, 
between the concurring and dissenting judgments themselves 
regarding whether JFS indirectly discriminated against M on racial or 
ethnic grounds and the ensuing attempts to reconcile the competing 
claims of right using the concepts of “legitimate aim” and 
“proportionality” (Section B).  
The Article argues that these twin divergences in reasoning 
illustrate the three dominant themes in modern discourse regarding 
the conceptual structure, subject and authority of the right to religious 
freedom (Section C). The Article concludes by considering the 
implications of these themes for legal reasoning and contestation 
more broadly concerning the right to religious freedom.  
I.  STATE NEUTRALITY TOWARDS RELIGION 
As described in Heather Miller Rubens’ case study,12 the facts of 
the case are relatively straightforward. The Jews’ Free School 
(“JFS”) was founded in 1732 and is today one of the best, state-
funded schools in London. JFS gives preference to Jews in its 
admissions decisions and recognizes the authority of the Office of the 
Chief Rabbi, as head of the United Synagogue, to determine who is 
Jewish for these purposes. This is permitted under English law but 
only on the basis that the determination is made on grounds of 
“religious” belief, membership or practice. Under the RRA 1976, 
there is no exemption for discrimination on grounds of “race” which 
is defined to include “ethnic or national origins.”  
A 12-year old boy “M” applied for admission to the school. M’s 
mother, who was Italian Catholic by birth, had converted to Judaism 
under the supervision of a non-Orthodox (Masorti) rabbinate. M was 
living with his father at the time and they were both members of a 
Masorti synagogue. M was denied admission because he was not 
recognized as being Jewish according to Orthodox interpretation of 
halakhah according to which M would be considered Jewish only if 
his mother was Jewish (the matrilineal test) or if M underwent a 
conversion under the supervision of an Orthodox rabbi. Given that 
the Office of the Chief Rabbi did not recognize the conversion of M’s 
mother on the basis that it did not recognize the halakhic authority of 
the Masorti Rabbinic courts, and given that M himself did not wish to 
 
12. Heather Miller Rubens, “Something has Gone Wrong”: The JFS Case and 
Defining Jewish Identity in the Courtroom, 29 MD. J. INT’L L. 366 (2014).  
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undergo an Orthodox conversion, M was denied admission to JFS 
(his family’s practice of Judaism notwithstanding).  
M’s father sued JFS arguing that the school’s use of the 
matrilineal test in its admission policy violated the RRA 1976. A 
court at first instance upheld the school’s right to deny M admission. 
This was reversed on appeal and the case then came before the new 
U.K. Supreme Court. All nine judges wrote separate opinions 
reflecting striking differences in judicial reasoning and the 
complexity of the issues under consideration. Despite their 
differences, most expressed “sympathy” with the governors of the 
school and expressed great anxiety about the Court’s decision stating 
that they thought “something has gone wrong.” 
A majority of five judges (Lords Phillips, Mance, Kerr, Clarke 
and Lady Hale) held that the admissions policy of JFS constituted 
direct racial discrimination under the RRA 1976 on the grounds that 
the criteria used by JFS to select pupils treated applicants differently 
on account of their “ethnic origins.” Two judges (Lords Hope and 
Walker) concurred in this result but found instead that the admissions 
policy of JFS constituted permissible religious discrimination which 
had the unlawful effect of indirect racial or ethnic discrimination. The 
remaining two judges (Lords Rodger and Brown) dissented finding 
that JFS’s admissions policy was neither directly nor indirectly 
discriminatory under the RRA 1976. 
Historically, there are several ways to view neutrality and 
equality of treatment in religious matters. As Christopher McCrudden 
has observed, British legal policy towards majority and minority 
religious groups has moved through at least three main phases: first, a 
phase in the early nineteenth century of political compromises 
accommodating conflicting interests;13 second, a mid‒1960s 
“multicultural” phase which relied primarily on antidiscrimination 
law and accommodation of “new” ethnic groups,14 and third, a 
 
13. Christopher McCrudden, Multiculturalism, Freedom of Religion, Equality, 
and the British Constitution: the JFS Case Considered, 9 INT’L J. CONST. L. (I‒
CON) 200 (2011). This approach had two features: first, judicial abstinence on the 
theory that matters of religious controversy are better left to the legislature; and 
second, pragmatic empiricism in the legislature where compromises are sought in 
direct negotiations between religious communities and the government often 
resulting in technical and nuanced statutory schemes as opposed to controversial 
disputes of high constitutional principle. Id.  
14. Id. These accommodations and exemptions from general laws were thought 
to concern primarily “racial” or “ethnic” issues and thus not to have great relevance 
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contemporary phase of “constitutional idealism” which focuses more 
on “principle” and the notion of fundamental rights as enacted in 
legislation such as the Human Rights Act 1998,15 which incorporated 
the European Convention on Human Rights into British domestic 
law. 
This shift towards quasi-constitutional liberal principles has 
supplanted the legislative contingency of the pre-multicultural phase 
and the integrationism and antidiscrimination focus of the 
multicultural phase. Consequently, it has been left to the judiciary to 
determine how to apply conflicts involving religion, culture and 
ethnicity. Practices previously regarded as “ethnic” and raising 
correlative duties of non-discrimination are today often viewed as 
“religious” to be adjudicated as a matter of individual rights.16 It was 
in context of this normative shift towards liberal rights discourse in 
British constitutionalism that the JFS case was both argued and 
ultimately decided by the U.K. Supreme Court.  
Given this background, what does it mean for a nation state to be 
neutral towards Judaism as a “religion”? If neutrality previously 
meant affirmative engagement by the state with existing Jewish 
communities on matters pertaining to Jewish belief and practice, and 
later protection of such minority communities from acts of unlawful 
racial or ethnic discrimination, then today neutrality appears to be 
understood as the protection of the human right to freedom of 
religion and belief. In this series of moves, neutrality towards religion 
as an institution, practice, or tradition has shifted almost 
imperceptibly to the question of the right to freedom of religion, 
which suggests that the state adjudicates between competing rights 
and not neutrality towards competing religions. This, as we shall see, 
is a shift fraught with consequences. 
Such a shift in emphasis regarding the category demarcated as 
“religious” is not immediately apparent in JFS given that the 
judgments focus on the meaning of “racial grounds” in section 
1(1)(a) of the RRA 1976 as further elaborated in section 3 to include 
 
to the “pre‒multicultural type of accommodations involving Judeo‒Christian 
practices and beliefs” which continued unaffected. Id. 
15. Human Rights Act, 1998, c.42 (U.K.). The Act incorporated the European 
Convention on Human Rights into UK domestic law. Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 
221, E.T.S. 5. But see infra note 97. 
16. Cf. Mandla v. Dowell Lee, [1983] 2 AC 548 (wearing of the turban held to 
be an ethnic practice) with R (Watkins‒Singh) v. The Governing Body of Aberdare 
Girls’ High School [2008] EWHC 1865 (Admin) (wearing of the Kara held to be 
both a religious and ethnic practice).  
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“ethnic or national origins.” But what is implicit in both the Act and 
the Court’s interpretation of these provisions is that the RRA’s 
prohibition on racial and ethnic discrimination is concordant with 
both (1) the permission granted to schools having a religious 
character to engage in religious discrimination under section 50 of the 
Equality Act 2006,17 and (2) the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion protected under Article 9, Schedule 1 of the 
Human Rights Act 1998.18 To the extent that any conflict or 
inconsistency is contemplated, the School Standards and Framework 
Act 1998 makes it clear that school governing bodies must act in 
accordance with codes of practice issued by the Secretary of State. 
The relevant paragraphs in the School Admissions Code for 2007 
dealing with faith-based oversubscription criteria provide that such 
 
17. Equality Act, 2006, c.3 (U.K.). Part 2 of the Act prohibits discrimination 
on the grounds of religion or belief in the provision of goods and services and § 49 
makes it unlawful for a school maintained by a local education authority to 
discriminate by inter alia refusing to accept an application to admit a person as a 
pupil. § 50, however, contains a list of exceptions to section 49 including an 
exception in favor of a school designated by the Secretary of State as having a 
“religious character” under section 69(3) of the School Standards and Framework 
Act 1998. As noted by Lord Hope in JFS, § 50 “does no more than immunize the 
school from liability for religious discrimination under the 2006 [Equality] Act”. 
JFS, [2009] UKSC 15 ¶ 175. It should be noted that following the JFS case, British 
antidiscrimination law was consolidated and reformed in the Equality Act, 2010, 
c.15 (U.K.). Part 6 of the 2010 Act addresses discrimination in education and 
prohibits discrimination in the admissions process on protected grounds including 
religion. § 85(1). The schedules to the Act then provide a series of exceptions 
allowing long‒standing educational practices, such as single‒sex and religious 
schools which by their nature directly discriminate on the basis of characteristics 
protected by the Act, to continue. Sch. 11 ¶¶ 4–6. Thus, schools with a religious 
character may still discriminate in their admissions process by giving preference 
based on religion. Sch. 11, ¶ 5.  
18. Human Rights Act 1998, c. 42. The purpose of the Act is to “to give further 
effect to rights and freedoms guaranteed under the European Convention on Human 
Rights”. Schedule 1 sets out the Convention rights and this includes Article 9 
which provides as follows: 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and 
freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, 
to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and 
observance. 
2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only 
to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of 
public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others. 
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“faith-based criteria must be framed so as not to conflict with other 
legislation such as equality and race relations legislation.”19 
The logic of this statutory framework is that whatever 
permissible religious discrimination and the right to freedom of 
religion and belief collectively encompass, this does not include any 
act or practice which constitutes racial or ethnic discrimination under 
the RRA 1976. The notion that race and ethnicity are, in principle, 
irrelevant to the just treatment of persons on religious grounds and 
that religion is a distinct and neatly separable sphere from such 
matters are grounds on which the case is contested.  
A.    Racial Discrimination 
The RRA 1976 prohibits discrimination on grounds of race but 
only in specific fields of employment, the provision of goods and 
services, education and public functions. This leaves other areas of 
private and social life such as personal relationships, the family, and 
religion (to the extent these do not overlap with the former 
categories)20 unregulated by the Act. In this respect, “private” acts of 
racial discrimination are permitted under English law and the scope 
of the RRA 1976 is premised on a particular background 
understanding of the public-private divide. Thus, for example, an 
individual excluded from membership in a religious institution 
outside of the spheres of commerce, education, and employment is 
unable to sue that body for discrimination on the grounds of race or 
ethnicity under the RRA 1976.  
What is the justification then for the statutory prohibition of 
racial and ethnic discrimination and its limited scope? Legal 
restrictions on discrimination limit the freedom of persons to pursue 
their own social preferences on the premise of protecting the freedom 
of others. Not all discrimination is morally blameworthy (for 
example, one should discriminate between bullies and non-bullies21) 
 
19.  DEP’T. EDUC., SCH. ADMISSIONS. CODE ¶ 2.41(2007); cf. JFS [2009] 
UKSC 15 ¶ 176 (discussing the admissions code). Cf. Rubens, supra note 12 at 
385. 
20. Complex questions arise at the intersection of antidiscrimination law and 
religious freedom in areas such as employment in religious bodies: see, e.g., JULIAN 
RIVERS, THE LAW OF ORGANIZED RELIGIONS: BETWEEN ESTABLISHMENT AND 
SECULARISM 122‒37 (2010) (discussing exceptions based on (a) genuine 
occupational requirements where the employer has an ethos based on religion or 
belief and (b) employment or office‒holding for the purposes of an organized 
religion).  
21. John Gardner, On the Grounds of her Sex(uality), 18 OXFORD J. L. STUD. 
167, 167 (1998). 
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and thus some account is needed to explain when discrimination is 
morally wrongful. As John Gardner has argued, this is primarily a 
question of justice involving extended, context-relative issues of two 
orthodox legitimacy doctrines: on the one hand harm such as denial 
of opportunity, stigma and historical disadvantage,22 and on the other 
redistribution of effective social power in the form of correction of 
existing patterns of advantage and disadvantage.23 Following Raz, 
Gardner suggests that what unifies these doctrines is a “non-
individualistic theory of autonomy, according to which the state has 
its own project of providing the conditions of valuable flourishing for 
its citizens.”24  
In analyzing the distinction between legitimate and wrongful 
discrimination, Gardner refers to both the role of the discriminator as 
well as the grounds of discrimination. The question of role is an 
aspect of the public-private divide and the law’s assumption that 
certain actors such as employers, retailers, educators, and public 
officials stand in a different relative position to individuals acting in 
their private capacity. The question of grounds relates to a theory of 
justice which does not turn on an account of rationality per se (there 
may well be rational reasons in specific contexts to discriminate on 
grounds of race25) but rather the liberal idea of personal autonomy 
and the duty “to treat people in certain ways defined by reference to 
the way that others are treated.”26  
On this view, the ideal of a life lived autonomously is what best 
explains the two commonly recognized grounds for improper 
discrimination: immutable characteristics and fundamental choices.27 
The core point is that discrimination on the basis of immutable 
 
22. Paul Brest, In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 1 HARV. L. 
REV. 1, 8 (1970).  
23. John Gardner, Liberals and Unlawful Discrimination, 9 OXFORD J. L. 
STUD. 1, 5‒11 (1989). 
24. Id. at 22 (discussing JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 410 
(1986)). Gardner explores the idea in Raz that “we are pursuing a culture in which 
the value of personal autonomy is understood to be the core value” and in which 
autonomy itself is not an idea “which requires unfettered personal choice, but is 
instead the repository of shared cultural values.” Id. at 20‒21.  
25. For example: “[i]f your other customers will desert the pub when black 
people come in … then, like it or not, … [this is a reason] for discriminating 
against black people.” Id. 168. It is thus a basic premise of antidiscrimination law 
that it is sometimes wrong to act on a proposition that one is rationally correct to 
believe.  
26. John Gardner, Discrimination as Injustice, 16 OXFORD J. L. STUD. 353, 355 
(1996). 
27. Id. at 170.  
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characteristics violates this ideal because our most valuable choices – 
those we should have irrespective of whatever else we may choose – 
are constrained not by our own, but by the choices of others.28 This 
forecloses the possibility of a fully autonomous life. The duties of 
non-discrimination are thus autonomy-based duties: the duty imposed 
on discriminator X is by virtue of Y’s autonomy. Given that race is 
an immutable characteristic over which Y has no choice, any action 
based on that ground that treats Y less favorably than someone of 
another race is a violation of Y’s autonomy—the right to live her life 
based on her own valuable choices not the (morally improper) 
choices of X. At least in certain public roles then, X should not act in 
such a way so as to violate Y’s autonomy and the wrongfulness of 
X’s actions are linked to an improper ground figuring in the operative 
premises of X’s thinking towards Y.29  
Consequently, the grounds of the Jews’ Free School treatment 
towards M in relation to M’s autonomy are subject to strict scrutiny. 
JFS is viewed by the Court as a discriminator standing in a relative 
position of justice towards M and thus subject to legal duties to treat 
M no less favorably than any other applicant on the ground of race, 
including “ethnic origins”. The question is expressed by Lady Hale as 
follows: “do the criteria used by JFS to select pupils for the school 
treat people differently because of their ‘ethnic origins’”?30 The 
religious context, reasons and motive for applying the matrilineal test 
by JFS and the OCR are viewed by some of the Lords as irrelevant to 
this question of criteria or grounds.31 Again, as stated by Lady Hale: 
“[w]e do not need to look into the mind of the Chief Rabbi to know 
why he acted as he did. If the criterion he adopted was … in reality 
ethnicity-based, it matters not whether he was adopting it because of 
a sincerely held religious belief.”32 The Court simply asks: (a) What 
are the grounds upon which M was refused entry and (b) are those 
grounds racial?33 
This way of framing the case relies on an unarticulated 
distinction between internal belief on the one hand and external 
manifestation of that belief on the other in the form of action towards 
others. In order to determine the justice of a discriminatory action 
 
28. Id. at 171.  
29. Id. at 182.  
30. JFS, [2009] UKSC 15, ¶ 54 (Lady Hale).  
31. One can thus discriminate on racial grounds without meaning to do so or 
realizing that one is. Id. ¶¶ 56–57 (Lady Hale).  
32. Id. ¶ 65 (Lady Hale).  
33. Id. ¶ 12 (Lord Phillips). Cf. Rubens, supra note 12, at 389-90. 
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towards M (refusing admission), the Court must interrogate the 
grounds of that act, which in turn necessarily requires an assessment 
of the nature of the belief itself: i.e. the critical question for the Court 
is whether the criterion used by JFS and OCR to reject M (the 
matrilineal test) is “racial” or “religious”. Implicit in this dichotomy 
for the majority is the assumption that a legitimate religious ground 
for action towards others may not include racial or ethnic criteria (i.e. 
the absolute prohibition on direct racial discrimination) or, for the 
concurring judges, to the extent such criteria are part of a religious 
ground for action, they must conform to the disciplinary limitations 
of race discrimination legislation (i.e. indirect racial discrimination 
must be justified). In this exercise of its interpretive authority, the 
Court does not determine matters of religious doctrine per se but 
rather what about doctrine is essentially a religious matter.34 
B.   Religious Discrimination 
It follows then that the puzzle in JFS is why exactly religious 
discrimination is permitted under British law while racial and ethnic 
discrimination is categorically prohibited? Further, why is the 
category of permissible religious discrimination not understood to 
conflict or overlap with the category of racial and ethnic 
discrimination? The implicit holding of the majority’s interpretation 
of sections 1(1)(a) and 3 of the RRA 1976 is that racial and ethnic 
criteria used to determine religious identity are not properly part of 
the category understood as “religious.” The categories of race and 
ethnicity are, to this extent, connected to and even contingent on a 
prior conception of what constitutes religion and a proper religious 
subjectivity. 
This Article argues that religion is implicitly viewed by both the 
British legislature and courts as a matter of individual conscience or 
belief—a state of mind rather than an action or activity in the world—
to which an individual autonomously assents. Individual choice, as 
 	   34. Central to the logic of secular‒juridical genealogies of religious freedom is 
the concept of adiaphora which originates in the old Stoic idea of actions that 
morality neither mandates nor forbids and which within Christianity was 
understood to refer to matters regarded as inessential to faith but nevertheless 
permissible for Christians or allowed in the Church. The relevant point is that once 
acts were regarded not from a sacramental‒religious but political‒juridical 
standpoint as soteriologically indifferent, they could then be brought under the 
regulation of civil law. See Ian Hunter, Religious Freedom in Early Modern 
Germany: Theology, Philosophy and Legal Casuistry, 113 SOUTH ATL. Q. 37, 56 
(2014). On drawing the distinction between the “civil” and “religious” dimensions 
of an act, see infra Part II.C.1. 	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opposed to immutable characteristics such as race and ethnicity, is 
what constitutes the essential nature of religious identity and 
affiliation and decisions made by actors in public roles on this ground 
does not per se infringe the personal autonomy or valuable life 
choices of others. Choice and autonomy are sanctioned in law 
because this distributes responsibility and liability across a wide 
framework and permits neutrality to function in relation to agents as 
well as institutions. For example, a Muslim student not admitted to a 
Christian school on the basis of her religion, or refused permission to 
wear religious clothing such as the Islamic headscarf, can always 
choose to become a Christian or attend another Muslim or non-
religious school.35 Unlike race and ethnicity over which she has no or 
socially limited individual choice, religion can be understood as a 
matter of belief understood as internal to the subjectivity of the 
autonomous individual and hence also subject to a principle of 
neutrality.36  
This abstracted conception of religion is reiterated and relied 
upon throughout the reasoning of the majority and concurring 
judgments. For example, the majority cites with approval Lord 
Justice Sedley’s statement in Eweida v. British Airways that unlike 
the grounds of age, disability, gender, race, sex, and sexual 
orientation, discrimination on grounds of religion or belief is 
different: “One cannot help observing that all of these apart from 
 
35. The British case law has followed the European Court of Human Rights 
jurisprudence in considering whether an alternative is available to a claimant 
alleging interference with freedom of religion and often finding that any 
inconvenience incurred by the claimant was a result of her own choice. Thus, in 
R(Begum) v. Governors of Denbigh High School, Lord Bingham noted that the 
European Court has “not been at all ready to find interference with the right to 
manifest religious belief or observance where a person has voluntarily accepted an 
employment or role which does not accommodate that practice or observance and 
there are other means open to the person to practice or observe his or her religion 
without undue hardship or inconvenience.” [2006] UKHL 15, [2007] 1 AC 100, ¶ 
23. See McCrudden, supra note 13, at 19–20. 
36. Note, e.g., that under racial antidiscrimination law the British courts have 
held that there is no requirement to establish the absence of an alternative. Thus cf. 
R. (Watkins‒Singh) v. The Governing Body of Aberdare Girls’ High School, [2008] 
EWHC 1865, ¶ 69 (finding the refusal to allow the claimant to wear the Kara to be 
a “particular disadvantage” in a race/religious discrimination claim without 
considering whether she might attend another school) with R. (X) v. Headteachers 
and Governors of Y School, [2007] EWHC 298 (Admin), [2008] 1 All ER 249, 
[2007] HRLR 20, ¶ 40 (finding the availability of an alternative school meant that 
the refusal to allow the claimant to wear the niqab did not interfere with her 
freedom of religion). McCrudden, supra note 13, at 20. 
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religion or belief are objective characteristics of individuals: religion 
and belief alone are matters of choice.”37  
Similarly, the two concurring judgments view the competing 
claims at issue in the case through the lens of autonomous choice, 
whether the choice of M to follow a particular form of Judaism or the 
choice of JFS to prescribe its own chosen norms of religious identity 
and membership. It is implicit in the concurrence’s ultimate finding 
of indirect discrimination that JFS and the OCR have failed to 
consider and take seriously the valuable choice of M and his mother 
in electing a Masorti conversion and, conversely, electing not to 
undergo an orthodox conversion.  
For the majority, religion is thus a matter of choice while race 
and ethnicity are immutable, unchosen characteristics. Whether the 
matrilineal test is assented to as a matter of subjective belief or 
religious value is irrelevant to the objective fact that M and his 
mother’s ethnic origins were the factual ground that determined the 
admissions decision made by JFS.38 As stated by Lady Hale:  
M was rejected, not because of who he is, but because 
of who his mother is …. it was because his mother was 
not descended in the matrilineal line from the original 
Jewish people that he was rejected. This was because 
of his lack of descent from a particular ethnic group.39  
On the logic of this approach, religion is reduced to the object of 
a state of mind or “motive” in the mental decision-making of a 
discriminator which may be freely believed in but not, without 
reasonable justification, permitted to determine actions towards 
others. JFS and the OCR are thus free to believe in the matrilineal test 
and apply it in determining religious identity and membership in the 
 
37. [2010] EWCA Civ 80, ¶ 40.  
38. JFS, [2009] UKSC 15, ¶¶ 13, 16, 20, 62. For Lord Phillips, “grounds” are 
factual effects of a prior discriminatory judgment. Once discrimination has been 
made fact, the motives of discrimination are irrelevant. Id. ¶ 22. 
39. Id. ¶ 66 (Lady Hale). Lady Hale further notes that in enacting the RRA 
1976, Parliament adopted a model of formal equality which allows only carefully 
defined distinctions and otherwise expects “symmetry”:  
There can be no doubt that that, if an employer were to take exactly the 
same criterion as that used by the Office of the Chief Rabbi and refuse to 
employ a person because the Chief Rabbi would regard him as 
halachically Jewish, the employer would be treating that person less 
favorably on grounds of his ethnic origins. 
Id. ¶ 68 (Lady Hale). 
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privacy of a synagogue, civic organization or the home,40 but they are 
not free to apply the test as a criterion for determining admissions to 
a school subject to the discipline of racial antidiscrimination law. 
There are legal precedents for applying a distinction between belief 
and action, particularly in discrimination cases; however, there is the 
question as to whether the law is pursuing a legal end (neutrality) 
which has a secondary, delimiting effect on Jewish belief and 
practice or whether it is rather pursuing a political or ideological end 
which directly seek to control Jewish practice while limiting the 
extent of Jewish belief.  
C.   The Matrilineal Test as a “Ground” for Racial Discrimination 
Given the logic of this argument, what does it mean exactly for 
the matrilineal test to constitute a “ground”—as opposed to a 
“motive” or “reason”—for the decision by JFS to exclude M? One of 
the striking aspects of the JFS case is the extraordinary level of 
disagreement and ambiguity—even between those judges comprising 
the majority—on the question of the relationship between racial and 
religious grounds on the one hand and between grounds as a category 
more broadly and motives or reasons on the other. The ways in which 
these concepts and relations are imagined and interpreted provides 
the key to understanding the reasoning in the case. 
As a preliminary matter, it should be noted that the reasoning of 
the majority in fact reverses the normative understanding of the 
relationship between immutability and autonomy advanced by JFS 
and OCR in legal argument. The OCR acknowledged that “M was 
‘ethnically’ Jewish, in the sense that he self-identified as Jewish, he 
was significantly involved with the Jewish community in various 
ways, and he was accepted as Jewish by at least parts of the 
community.”41 Ethnicity for the OCR was thus not biological, but 
sociological, involving deep historical practices of social choice and 
collective autonomy. On the other hand, the OCR did not 
acknowledge that M was “religiously” Jewish because this was not a 
matter of individual or social choice but rather was to be determined 
by an Orthodox interpretation of halakhah which, as revealed 
religious law, is in some vital sense immutable and unchosen.  
 
40. Even in the private sphere, however, certain statutory or common law 
limitations may exist in areas such as employment and civil rights.  
41. McCrudden, supra note 13, at 13. On the reasoning of the House of Lords 
in Mandla v. Dowell‒Lee, if M was refused admission to a non‒faith based state 
school because he was Jewish, this would be racial discrimination because “he was 
being discriminated against on the grounds of his Jewish ethnicity.” Id. 
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The majority judgments do accept that the matrilineal descent 
test is applied by JFS and OCR in order to comply with Orthodox 
Jewish religious law.42 But in a forthright statement by Lord Phillips, 
the inquiry into the reasoning behind the matrilineal test and related 
conversion criteria and how these are understood within Jewish 
religious law are viewed as “subjective” motives which are then 
rejected as irrelevant to the factual question of direct racial 
discrimination.43 This rejection is premised on a strong distinction 
between internal motive and external action, between why and how: 
the reason why the test is practised is deemed subservient to how it is 
practised as a matter of objectively ascertainable fact. This telescopic 
reduction of an entire discursive tradition and its centuries-old 
reasoning and normative system into a mere subjective “motive,” in 
contradistinction to a discriminatory “fact” or “ground,” calls for 
serious consideration. 
There are two factors at issue in Lord Phillips’ interpretation of 
the notion of “grounds”. First, we have seen that the RRA 1976 
prohibits discrimination on “racial” grounds; this allows for lawful 
discrimination (absent other legal restrictions) on non-racial grounds. 
Accordingly, the law requires a distinction to be drawn between 
racial and non-racial grounds in cases of direct discrimination. In the 
JFS case, this distinction is drawn between racial and religious 
grounds, which implies that there exists a kind of ground that is 
religious and lawful. In addition, it implies that to be lawful a 
religious ground is not a racial (including ethnic) ground.  
The second factor is that Lord Phillips notes that the very term 
“grounds” is ambiguous and may refer to both a “motive” and 
“factual criteria”. The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines grounds as 
“factors forming a basis for action or the justification for a belief,” 
which is likewise ambiguous. This turns on the term “factor” which is 
defined as “a circumstance, fact or influence that contributes to a 
result”. Lord Phillips cuts through this ambiguity by declaring that 
grounds under the RRA 1976 means “factual criteria” rather than 
motive or justification for a belief.44  
 
42. JFS [2009] UKSC 15, ¶ 35. 
43. Id. See also ¶¶ 127, 132 (Lord Clarke).  
44. “Whether there has been discrimination on the ground of sex or race 
depends upon whether sex or race was the criterion applied as the basis for 
discrimination. The motive for discriminating according to that criterion is not 
relevant.” JFS at ¶ 20.  
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In so doing, he draws on R v. Birmingham City Council, Ex parte 
Equal Opportunities Commission where Lord Goff of Chieveley 
interpreted the Sex Discrimination Act 197545 as follows: 
The intention or motive of the defendant to 
discriminate, though it may be relevant so far as 
remedies are concerned … is not a necessary condition 
of liability; it is perfectly possible to envisage cases 
where the defendant had no such motive, and yet did 
in fact discriminate on the ground of sex .... 
[W]hatever may have been the intention or motive of 
the council, nevertheless it is because of their sex that 
the girls in question receive less favourable treatment 
than the boys, and so are the subject of discrimination 
under the Act of 1975.46 
The implication of Lord Phillip’s reasoning is that a racial or 
ethnic ground is based on factual criteria whereas a religious ground 
is based on motivational or belief-based criteria. The division 
between race and religion thus corresponds to the fact/value 
distinction: racial and ethnic criteria are objective, value-neutral facts 
whereas religious criteria are subjective, non-factual values or beliefs 
to which a person may choose to assent.  
On the logic of this distinction, Judaism is indicted for 
containing a factual, descent criterion, even if interpreted according 
to religious law, as part of its internal understanding of religious 
identity and membership. Given that religion and ethnicity in the 
 
45. Sex Discrimination Act, 1975, c.65. 
46. [1989] AC 1155 ¶ 13. The distinction was also relevant in James v 
Eastleigh Borough Council [1990] 2 AC 751, where the issue of motive versus 
factual criterion for discrimination split the House of Lords which by majority 
overturned the Court of Appeal and found that the reasons for the Council’s 
irregular policy on free swimming lessons for pensioners was on the grounds of 
sex. Lord Phillips in JFS cites Lord Bridge in James for the majority:  
The Court of Appeal’s attempt to escape from these conclusions lies in 
construing the phrase ‘on the ground of her sex’ in section 1(1)(a) as 
referring subjectively to the alleged discriminator’s ‘reason’ for doing the 
act complained of. As already noted, the judgment had earlier identified 
the council’s reason as ‘to give benefits to those whose resources would be 
likely to have been reduced by retirement’ and ‘to aid the needy, whether 
male or female.’ But to construe the phrase, ‘on the ground of her sex’ as 
referring to the alleged discriminator’s reason in this sense is directly 
contrary to a long line of authority confirmed by your Lordships’ House in 
[Birmingham City Council]. 
JFS, [2009] UKSC 15, ¶ 15 (Lord Phillips). 
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form of matrilineal descent are deeply intertwined in Judaism’s self-
understanding, the effect of the majority’s distinction between 
objective fact and subjective belief is to intervene directly into and 
thus regulate this religious self-understanding as it pertains to the 
sphere of an educational institution made subject to the civil 
jurisdiction of state law by the RRA 1976. 
Even as part of the majority, Lord Clarke seeks to avoid this 
either/or division between race and religion and the implication that if 
discrimination is racial or ethnic then it is not religious and vice 
versa. For Lord Clarke, the unfair treatment of M was on both 
religious and ethnic grounds.47 But while the ethnic origins of Jews 
such as M may indeed have been a matter of complete indifference to 
the OCR and JFS, “the reason they are not members of the Orthodox 
Jewish religion is that their forbears in the matrilineal line were not 
recognised as Jewish by Orthodox Jews and in this sense their less 
favourable treatment is determined by their descent.”48 Given that the 
religious ground was based upon an ethnic ground, this was held to 
be direct discrimination under the RRA 1976.49 
What is critical to see, however, is that this purportedly bright-
line distinction is in fact essentially-contested, unstable, and 
normatively non-neutral. The main ambiguity relates to the notion of 
“factual criteria” itself. Does this refer to the treatment of M and the 
assertion that M’s descent from a particular ethnic group, whether 
ascertained on religious grounds or not, constitutes the factual 
criterion for the decision by JFS to reject M? Or does it refer instead 
to the matrilineal test itself which again, for either religious or non-
religious reasons, is premised on descent-based factual criteria? As 
we shall see in the reasoning in the concurring and dissenting 
judgments, this ambiguity has important consequences for the 
domain of religious freedom.  
Lord Phillips seeks to avoid this controversy by insisting that it 
is the treatment of M on a ground prohibited by the RRA 1976 that is 
the critical fact.  On this basis, any normative source, subjective 
motive, or rational justification for such treatment, whether religious 
or not, is irrelevant to the question of direct racial discrimination. 
This line of reasoning, however, is unpersuasive for two reasons. 
First, if denial of personal autonomy and valuable choices on the 
basis of immutable characteristics is what best explains the rationale 
 
47.  JFS, [2009] UKSC 15, ¶¶ 129–30.  
48. Id. ¶ 128.  
49.  Id. ¶ 129.  
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for racial antidiscrimination law, the rejection of M by JFS does not 
easily fit into this logic. As noted above, both JFS and the OCR 
acknowledged in legal argument that M was ethnically Jewish; their 
grounds for refusing him admission were instead that he was not 
halakhically Jewish. Given that both M and his mother remained free 
to undergo Orthodox conversion or attend another Jewish or non-
religious school, it is difficult to see how his autonomy was violated 
on the basis of immutable characteristics. 
In response, one could argue that the effect of the matrilineal test 
is to treat one group of Jews less favorably than another solely on the 
basis of their descent, which is a fundamentally immutable, factual 
characteristic. But here again the position is more complex. The 
notion of descent under Orthodox Jewish religious in fact 
encompasses elements of autonomy and choice on the basis that 
matrilineal descent is established in the case of a mother who herself 
becomes Jewish not by descent but by recognized conversion.50 
Jewish membership and identity are in this way neither linked nor 
restricted to any closed or clearly-defined racial or ethnic group.  This 
unsettles and diverges from the understanding of immutability at the 
heart of racial antidiscrimination law and demonstrates how any clear 
demarcation between fact and value in establishing either the grounds 
of decision made by JFS or the relevant characteristics of M is 
impossible.  
A second ambiguity lies in Lord Phillip’s rejection of the 
relevance of motive and reasons in determining the criterion for a 
racially discriminatory action. This does not diminish the fact that it 
was Orthodox Jewish religious law that was the basis of the advice 
offered by the OCR and thus the exclusionary decision made by JFS.  
The necessary implication of the majority’s interpretation of sections 
1(1)(a) and 3 of the RRA 1976 is that Jewish religious law, in the 
 
50. This point is made in an example offered by Lord Hope:  
A is the child of parents, and the grandchild of grandparents, all of whom 
led wholly secular lives similar to those of their largely secular 
neighbours. They never observed Jewish religious law or joined in the 
social or cultural life of the Jewish communities where they lived, but 
there is unimpeachable documentary evidence that more than a century 
ago the mother of A’s maternal grandmother was converted in an 
Orthodox synagogue. To the OCR A is Jewish, despite his complete lack 
of Jewish ethnicity.  
Id. ¶ 203. 
Similarly, Lord Brown notes that “those presently admitted [to JFS] come from 
a ‘wide disparity of religious and cultural family backgrounds … even … from 
atheist or Catholic or Moslem families’”. Id. ¶ 253.  
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form of the matrilineal descent test, is itself unlawful and no benign 
motive or rational justification can alter this conclusion. The 
possibility that the category of religion itself includes some notion of 
descent is thus foreclosed a priori. As argued above, this claim is 
premised on a prior understanding of what constitutes religion which 
does not easily accommodate Judaism in any of its forms—whether 
Orthodox, Masorti, progressive or reform, all of which are based on 
the matrilineal test—or corresponding notions of membership and 
obligation under Jewish religious law. 
At a deeper level, what is most problematic and anxiety-inducing 
for the concurring and dissenting judges is the apparent willingness 
of the majority to allow state law to intervene directly into a matter of 
Jewish religious doctrine and what in reality is an intra-religious 
dispute between Jewish groups. It is this kind of direct state 
intervention and regulation of religious doctrine and practice that the 
right to religious freedom is usually assumed to prohibit.  
For this reason, Lord Hope begins his concurring judgment by 
stating that “[i]t has long been understood that it is not the business of 
the courts to intervene in matters of religion” and that any court 
“must inevitably be wary of entering so self-evidently sensitive an 
area, straying across the well-recognized divide between church and 
state.”51 Given that “it is entirely a matter for the Chief Rabbi to 
adjudicate on the principles of Orthodox Judaism,”52 and that 
“Jewishness based on matrilineal descent from Jewish ancestors has 
been the Orthodox religious rule for many thousands of years,”53 
Lord Hope adopts an entirely different approach to how to draw the 
distinction between the categories of racial and religious grounds.  
Unlike Lord Phillips, Lord Hope argues that both motive and 
reasons for action “may be highly relevant to the determination of the 
crucial question: was this discrimination on racial grounds.”54 Further 
disagreeing with Lord Clarke, he argues that the motivation and state 
of mind of the alleged discriminator is crucial to determining “why 
he acted as he did,” although once this is established, discriminatory 
treatment cannot be excused by looking “beyond it to why he decided 
to act in that way.”55 This subtle shift in terminology from a reason 
 
51. Id. ¶ 157. 
52. Id. ¶ 160. 
53. Id. ¶ 201. 
54. Id. ¶ 195. However, “once that conclusion has been reached, the fact that 
there may have been a benign reason for the discrimination is beside the point.” Id. 
55. Id. ¶ 197 (emphasis added). 
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for action to a reason to decide to act exposes the critical point of 
divergence between the reasoning of the majority and concurrence.  
Consider the following passage from Lord Hope which we quote 
in full: 
The OCR has left us in no doubt as to why it was 
acting as it did. If the Chief Rabbi were to be asked 
the question that was framed by Lord Nicholls [i.e. 
why did the alleged discriminator act as he did?], he 
would say his reason was that this was required of him 
by fundamental Orthodox Jewish religious law … To 
say that his ground was a racial one is to confuse the 
effect of the treatment with the ground itself. It does 
have the effect of putting M into an ethnic Jewish 
group which is different from that which the Chief 
Rabbi recognizes as Jewish. So he has been 
discriminated against. But it is a complete 
misconception, in my opinion, to categorize the 
ground as a racial one. There is nothing in the way the 
OCR handled the case or its reasoning that justifies 
that conclusion. It might have been justified if there 
were reasons for doubting the Chief Rabbi’s frankness 
or his good faith. But no-one has suggested that he did 
not mean what he said. As Lord Rodger points out, to 
reduce the religious element to the status of a mere 
motive is to misrepresent what he was doing.56 
For Lord Hope, there is a distinction between the reasoning that 
follows from an obligation to comply with Orthodox religious law on 
the one hand and from a personal decision or “motive” to apply that 
law on the other.57 The former is in some essential, although as yet 
unspecified, sense objective whereas the latter is subjective. Even if it 
 
56. Id. ¶ 201 (emphasis added). See also Lord Roger who states that “[t]he 
reality is that the Office of the Chief Rabbi, when deciding whether or not to 
confirm that someone is of Jewish status, gives its ruling on religious grounds.” Id. 
¶ 227. 
57. A similar point is made by Lord Rodger in dissent:  
[M’s] mother could have been as Italian in origins as Sophia Loren and as 
Roman Catholic as the Pope for all that the governors cared: the only thing 
that mattered was that she had not converted to Judaism under Orthodox 
auspices. It was her resulting non‒Jewish religious status in the Chief 
Rabbi’s eyes, not the fact that her ethnic origins were Italian and Roman 
Catholic, which meant that M was not considered for admission.  
Id. ¶ 227 (Lord Rodger, dissenting).  
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is accepted, contra the majority, that the “state of mind of the alleged 
discriminator” is relevant to determining the grounds of decision, this 
state of mind cannot be reduced to a “mere motive” or personal belief 
but must take account of the unique nature of obligation imposed by 
halakhah. 
In observing a noticeable change in British law in that previous 
judicial reticence has been replaced with “a more self-confident 
willingness to adjudicate contested issues touching on the religious 
sphere,” Christopher McCrudden has noted the serious 
epistemological difficulties that courts encounter when seeking to 
interpret and understand rival normative systems. In particular, 
McCrudden points to HLA Hart’s famous distinction in The Concept 
of Law between the external and internal points of view and the need 
to understand normative systems, and official acts taken within those 
systems, from an internal perspective. McCrudden notes that Neil 
MacCormick further distinguished between two components of 
Hart’s internal point of view: between a cognitive viewpoint 
understood in terms of the standards being used by an agent to guide 
conduct, and a volitional viewpoint understood in terms of an agent’s 
own reasons for observance of a pattern of conduct as a standard for 
herself or others.  
Lord Hope appears to adopt the internal cognitive point of view 
in adjudicating the first level question of the distinction between 
racial and religious grounds and he only moves to a volitional point 
of view at the second level of motive which is then held to be an 
insufficient factor to excuse racially discriminatory conduct 
established at the first level. By contrast, Lord Phillips appears to 
adopt an external point of view towards Judaism as a religion and a 
solely volitional point of view in considering the discriminatory 
action of JFS and the OCR which, as “mere motive,” is held to be 
irrelevant to the question of determining racial grounds. Lord 
Phillips, for example, states that “[m]embership of a religion or faith 
indicates some degree of conscious affiliation with the religion or 
faith on the part of the member.”58 But before the Court, the OCR 
explicitly denied the need for any such conscious affiliation in 
Judaism arguing that “one could be Jewish according to religious law 
and explicitly reject any conscious affiliation with the Jewish religion 
or faith.”59  
 
58. Id. ¶ 44. 
59. McCrudden, supra note 13, at 26. 
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What is the consequence of Lord Hope’s distinction between 
objective cognition and subjective volition as a matter of law and 
legal reasoning? The distinction does not mean that the justice of 
ensuing discriminatory action by JFS towards M is not subject to the 
jurisdiction of civil law. Rather, this is to be dealt with at the 
secondary level of indirect racial discrimination where the question 
now is not the ground of decision but whether the effect of an action 
is to put M at a particular disadvantage as compared with other Jews 
recognized under the matrilineal descent test. This shifts the focus of 
antidiscrimination law away from the merits of Jewish religious law 
and the matrilineal test—matters of religious doctrine considered 
central to Judaism and within the forum internum of the right to 
religious liberty60—and towards the relative merits of any harm 
caused by the treatment of M. 
While Lord Hope and Lord Walker ultimately find that JFS has 
indirectly discriminated against M, their approach to the initial 
question of grounds for direct discrimination opens the space for 
rational deliberation allowing JFS and the OCR to advance reasons 
and seek to justify both the nature of their halakhic obligation and the 
application of the matrilineal descent test in the school’s admissions 
policy. As discussed above, this justificatory discourse is foreclosed 
under the approach of the majority which will not allow consideration 
of motive or reasons (religious or otherwise) to establish or, once 
established, justify a racial or ethnic ground of decision.  
In conclusion, what divides the majority and concurrence on the 
question of religious versus racial grounds is competing conceptions 
of the category understood as “religious.” For the majority, religion is 
a matter of subjective belief and assent to creedal propositions that is 
internal to the mind and volitional consciousness of each person. For 
the concurrence, however, religion includes such subjective beliefs 
but may also encompass objective reasons or obligations derived 
from an “external” discursive tradition encompassing its own 
sources, justifications and hermeneutics and thus its own conceptions 
of religious identity, membership and practice. While the majority 
conception remains within a non-naturalist, rationalistic framework 
of normativity, to reduce such a tradition to a subjective belief or 
motive, which the law then deems irrelevant and outside the 
 
60. A similar sentiment is expressed by Lord Brown in dissent. “The root 
question for the Court is simply this: can a Jewish faith school ever give preference 
to those who are members of the Jewish religion under Jewish law. I would answer: 
yes, it can. To hold the contrary would be to stigmatize Judaism as a directly 
discriminating religion.” JFS, [2009] UKSC 15, ¶ 249 (Lord Brown, dissenting).  
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boundaries of justification in determining the grounds of racial 
discrimination, is to make two errors: first, by superimposing upon 
Judaism a distinctly Christian and therefore non-neutral conception of 
religion and second, by interpreting religious freedom solely in terms 
of liberal rights and a liberal conception of individual freedom. 
D.   Judaism as a Religion 
Let us return to our previous question: what would it mean for 
the state to be neutral towards Judaism as a religion? Following the 
discussion above, it is clear that much depends on where and how the 
law applies its neutrality principle and in what respects. We have 
seen in Section A how as a matter of British law and policy, 
neutrality has in the past been applied to minority religions through 
ad hoc legislative engagement and pragmatic accommodation of 
particular religious bodies, beliefs, and practices.61 In the 
multicultural phases of British legal history, neutrality was sought 
instead by way of antidiscrimination and equality law in order to 
protect distinct racial and ethnic groups. 
But in what may be considered the current phase of 
constitutional idealism, these earlier forms of neutrality are being 
renegotiated. The JFS case reveals a complex, hybrid form of 
neutrality which seeks equality by way of a combination of 
antidiscrimination and human rights law. Hence, how is neutrality to 
be achieved with regard to religion in general and Judaism in 
particular? On what basis does a majority of the U.K. Supreme Court 
assume that religion, properly understood, is not or should not be 
defined by or entangled with issues of race, ethnicity or descent but is 
instead interior to human consciousness constituting a subjective or 
private realm over and against an objective field of facts.62 
Any attempt to define religion gives rise to notorious 
epistemological and ontological difficulties of delimitation and 
inclusionary/exclusionary categories as well as raising related 
questions about the purpose that such a definition serves. In JFS, a 
majority of the judges appear to understand religion as an 
 
61. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.  
62. JFS, [2009] UKSC 15, ¶¶ 23, 35, 45, 78. This interiority can be correlated 
with the complex story of European secularisation and historical evolution of 
secular state authority and a broadly Christian understanding of religion in terms of 
faith. This point was made by J. H. H. Weiler. Discrimination and Identity in 
London: The Jewish Free School Case, JEWISH REVIEW OF BOOKS Spring 2010, 
available at https://jewishreviewofbooks.com/articles/97/discrimination‒and‒
identity‒in‒london‒the‒jewish‒free‒school‒case. 
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epistemologically distinct form of non-ethnic belief that parallels 
both Christian commitment and an Enlightenment view of religious 
identity as a matter of internal private conscience. But as the 
submissions of JFS make clear, Judaism contests both the neutrality 
and universality of this conception. Nevertheless, any attempt to 
arrive at an understanding of Judaism as a religion is deeply 
problematic for reasons specific to the nature and history of Judaism 
itself.  
First, “Judaism” and cognate terms are contested concepts. The 
words “Jew,” “Jewish,” or “Judaism” can be used to refer to religion, 
nationality, ethnicity, or culture, which overrun what a legal 
definition requires and there are disparaging comments from the 
judges indicating discomfort with the slippery task of definition and 
judgment. Scholars differ on when Judaism as a religion begins. 
Daniel Boyarin argues that Judaism only achieves distinct 
definitional status in opposition to Christianity in late antiquity; 
whereas Leora Batnitzky places the origin of Judaism as a religion in 
the modern European context with thinkers such as Moses 
Mendelssohn playing a decisive role in defining “Judaism”.63 
Michael L. Satlow argues that most scholars and encyclopedias evade 
the problem of defining Judaism as a religion or revert to essentialist 
notions reliant on Jewish self-understanding.64 For this reason, when 
scholars of Judaism approach these topics, they limit their liability by 
defining what form of Judaism they are addressing in their work, be it 
“rabbinic,” “traditional,” “modern,” or “theological” Judaism.65 
Nevertheless, there is some agreement that the rise of the modern 
nation-state transformed relations between secular governance and 
religious practices and removed religious bodies to well-regulated 
private spheres.  
 
63. See DANIEL BOYARIN, BORDER LINES: THE PARTITION OF JUDAEO‒
CHRISTIANITY 11 (2004); LEORA BATNITZKY, HOW JUDAISM BECAME A RELIGION: 
AN INTRODUCTION TO MODERN JEWISH THOUGHT 13–31 (2011). 
64. Michael L. Satlow, Defining Judaism: Accounting for “Religions” in the 
Study of Religion, 74 J. AM. ACAD. RELIGION, 837 (2006); Leora Batnitzky, Modern 
Jewish Thought, in THE CAMBRIDGE GUIDE TO JEWISH HISTORY, RELIGION, AND 
CULTURE 424 (2010). 
65. See, e.g., JACOB NEUSNER, JUDAISM: THE EVIDENCE OF THE MISHNAH 1 
(1981); DAVID HARTMAN, A LIVING COVENANT: THE INNOVATIVE SPIRIT IN 
TRADITIONAL JUDAISM 1‒18 (1997); THE CAMBRIDGE GUIDE TO JEWISH HISTORY, 
RELIGION, AND CULTURE 1‒5 (Judith R. Baskin & Kenneth Seeskin eds., 2010); 
ELIEZER BERKOVITS, GOD, MAN AND HISTORY: A JEWISH INTERPRETATION 3‒10 
(1959); REVIEWING THE COVENANT: EUGEN B. BOROWITZ AND THE POSTMODERN 
RENEWAL OF JEWISH THEOLOGY 35‒45 (Peter Ochs ed., 2000).	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The secularization of European states was an ambiguous 
experience for European Jewry, for as Jews gained freedom and 
emancipation in many countries, Judaism as a religion was being 
privatized thorough the creation of newly formed secular powers. 
Consequently, secularization complicates attempts to define Judaism, 
because it opens up the possibility of a non-religious understanding 
of Judaism, where membership is not based on practice or belief, but 
rather on cultural or ethnic association. Were one to define Judaism 
solely in terms of “norms of conviction and conduct,” one would risk 
excluding many Jews who actively reject traditional religious 
norms.66 Scholars have become sensitive to the methodological 
problems generated by internal or first-order definitions, where a 
religion or community defines itself on its own self-understanding. 
Satlow, following Jonathan Z. Smith, valorizes second-order 
definitions that work on a descriptive and analytic model, which 
claims to diminish the normative aspects of first-order definitions.67 
However, questions surrounding definition, belief, and practice 
remain contentious and center on the various authorities invoked 
when seeking to authenticate belief and practice. 
Accordingly, it should come as no surprise that the law also 
finds it difficult to agree on the nature of Jewish religion. The Court 
is attempting to understand a dispute between an Orthodox religious 
institute, JFS, and a Masorti pupil who claims to be of the Jewish 
religion. What Judaism “is” is central to the case, as is a working 
understanding of Jewish law, or halakhah, which informs the 
school’s religious obligations. Despite the fact that the Court is ill-
equipped to deal with the workings of halakhah, it is obliged to rule 
on its usage in the case. A religious, or first-order, understanding of 
Jewish belief and practice differs markedly from an academic 
approach to the question of Judaism as a religion. Judaism is now 
striated by denominational differences; however, to comprehend 
Orthodox Judaism’s understanding of the law one is required to 
examine its foundational principles which originate in God’s 
revelation to Israel on Mount Sinai in both written (the Pentateuch) 
and oral (the Mishnah) form. The Oral Torah explains how the 
Written Torah and its laws are to be understood and applied. 
Although there are disputes over the precise content of Oral Torah, it 
is explicit in an Orthodox understanding of the Jewish tradition that 
 
66. JACOB NEUSNER, JUDAISM: THE BASICS ix‒x (2006). 
67. Satlow, supra note 64, at 843–53. 
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both the Written and Oral Torah are revealed by God directly to 
Moses and then transmitted through the tradition.68  
Jacob Neusner offers a general definition of halakhah which 
encompasses not only a distinction between the written and oral 
traditions, but also between the legal elements (halakhah) and the 
narrative elements (aggadah) of Judaism: 
The normative law, or Halakhah, of the Oral Torah 
define the principal medium by which the Rabbinic 
sages who in antiquity founded Judaism as we know it 
set forth their message. Norms of conduct, more than 
norms of conviction, served to convey the sages’ 
statement. But the exposition of matters of religious 
belief, or Aggadah, undertakes a critical task as well, 
and how the Halakhah and the Aggadah together set 
forth the theology of Judaism whole and in proportion 
and balance. One without the other leaves the work 
incomplete.69 
The Written and Oral Torah include belief as well as law and 
advance the thesis of Torah as a living covenant. In Orthodoxy, there 
is a positive relationship between the divine origins of written and 
oral law and the aggadic narratives that expound beliefs; all elements 
are necessary for understanding how the law is applied in context and 
as a whole. In contrast, Masorti and Conservative Judaism, while 
accepting the authoritative texts and broad strokes of the tradition, 
differ in principle on the nature and hence the authority of Written 
and Oral Torah. As Dr. Louis Jacobs, the founder of Conservatism 
(Masorti) Judaism in Great Britain explains: 
Conservative Judaism affirms the validity of the 
traditional observances, accepting the authority of the 
Halakhah, yet more open to change than Orthodoxy. 
Conservative Judaism maintains that historical 
investigation has exposed the inadequacies of 
Orthodox theory. The Torah, on this view, has now to 
 
68. The Mishnah tractate Pirkei Avot (Ethics of the Fathers) recounts this 
transmission: “Moses received the Law from Sinai and committed it to Joshua, and 
Joshua to the elders, and the elders to the Prophets; and the Prophets committed it 
to the men of the Great Synagogue. They said three things: Be deliberate in 
judgment, raise up many disciples, and make a fence around the Law.” THE 
MISHNAH (Herbert Danby trans., 1933) Nezikin, Tractate Avoth, 446. 
69. JACOB NEUSNER, THE HALAKHAH: HISTORICAL AND RELIGIOUS 
PERSPECTIVES 74 (2002). 
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be seen not as a single entity revealed by God at one 
time in its entirety, but as the product of the historical 
experiences of the Jewish people over the ages in their 
long quest for God. In the Conservative view, Jewish 
observances are binding on the Jew because they are 
the means by which he gives expression to his 
religious life. Divine inspiration is seen in a dynamic 
way; a human element is always present to understand 
and co-operate with the divine. On this view God did 
not only give the Torah to Israel but through Israel. 
Accordingly, the devout Jew can allow himself to be 
completely open on the question of origins; this is a 
matter of scholarship, not of faith. But it is not origins 
which matter for religion. What matters is the 
development of ideas and institutions so as to serve 
the Jewish quest for God.70 
It is the issue of the exact nature of Written and Oral Torah that 
divides Orthodoxy from movements such as Masorti Judaism. 
Orthodox Judaism regards divine revelation to be the central, factual 
element of religious life, whereas Masorti and Conservative Judaism 
appear to both adopt a skeptical position that accepts historical and 
scientific critique while they are content to understand revelation as a 
divinely inspired but human-centered experience. Hence, rather than 
simply understanding the dispute in terms of a conflict between a 
modern and pre-modern account of Jewish belief and practice, it is 
more instructive to see how the JFS case is asked to address basic 
conceptual differences in the tradition and how those differences 
impact religious obligation and authority. It is apparent that a 
traditional Orthodox understanding of Judaism contests the reduction 
of Judaism to historical contingency and expressions of faith. It is 
equally apparent why the courts have traditionally been reluctant to 
enter such religious debates. How then is neutrality to be applied to 
Judaism if the law restricts its understanding of religion to an internal 
or subjective belief and then disciplines Orthodox Judaism for 
transgressing this category? 
 
 70. LOUIS JACOBS, THE JEWISH RELIGION: A COMPANION 5–6 (1995); cf. LOUIS 
JACOBS, WE HAVE REASON TO BELIEVE (1957); JONATHAN SACKS, CRISIS AND 
COVENANT (1992); Michael Harris, Traditional Alternatives: Michael Harris On 
Orthodox Reservations About The Theology Of Louis Jacobs, JEWISH QUARTERLY 
(Autumn 2006), available at http://www.jewishquarterly.org/issuearchive/article01 
b5.html?articleid=231; Masorti Judiasm, Do Masorti Jews Believe the Torah 
Comes From Heaven, available at http://www.masorti.org.uk/frequently_asked_qu 
estions.htm#Do_Masorti_Jews_believe_that_the_Torah_comes_from_heaven. 
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It is this deflationary understanding of Jewish religion that serves 
to frame Jewish religion as an unlawful ground in keeping with 
traditional Christianity’s endeavor to define Judaism as an 
illegitimate or antiquated religion for the very reason that Jews as a 
people are bound to ancient law and practice.71 What the Court in 
JFS, philosophers and theologians fail to accept is that for Orthodox 
Judaism the relation between the individual, nation, God and the 
world as a whole is maintained in and through Torah, which 
encompasses statutory observance, faith, knowledge, spirit, charity 
and good deeds of the nation of Israel as a whole. As Rabbi Tzvi 
Yehuda Kook explains, while Torah and performance of 
commandments benefit individuals, it is the concept of Klal Yisrael, 
the nation of Israel as a whole, that is central to forming a 
relationship with God.72 Thus, “[w]ith a proper understanding of the 
Clal, the service of Hashem [God] becomes, not only a private 
observance of Torah and precepts, but the national observance of 
Torah as well.”73 
When considering the aspects of the case that surround 
membership criteria and the matrilineal test, the conflicting 
standpoints are sharply brought to light. While one can frame Jewish 
membership as an “ethnic” category under the RRA 1976 given that 
membership is set by descent and covenant set down before the birth 
of the subject, this does not accurately describe the normative 
relations involved. Descent is set by terms of the covenant between 
God and Israel, which includes descendants from the original 
covenant on Mount Sinai. The original acceptance of the 
commandments, the religious acts, binds Israel and their descendants 
to perform those acts. In the shadow of this covenant, one does not 
 
71. See, e.g., the epigraph to this Article from KANT, RELIGION, supra note 1. 
See also 2 Corinthians 3:13‒18:  
We are not like Moses, who would put a veil over his face to prevent the 
Israelites from seeing the end of what was passing away. But their minds 
were made dull, for to this day the same veil remains when the old 
covenant is read. It has not been removed, because only in Christ is it 
taken away. Even to this day when Moses is read, a veil covers their 
hearts. But whenever anyone turns to the Lord, the veil is taken away. 
Now the Lord is the Spirit, and where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is 
freedom. And we all, who with unveiled faces contemplate the Lord’s 
glory, are being transformed into his image with ever‒increasing glory, 
which comes from the Lord, who is the Spirit.	  
72. TORAT ERETZ YISRAEL: THE TEACHINGS OF HARAV TZVI YEHUDA 
HACOHEN KOOK 27‒44 (HaRav Shlomo ed., Chaim HaCohen Aviner, trans., 
1991).	  
73. Id. at 33.	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simply consent to Judaism as a creedal belief; rather, a Jew is 
someone obligated to observe the Law. The obligation to observe the 
commandments precedes the subject and needs first to be incumbent 
on that subject for an act to have any religious purchase. It is for this 
reason that the conversion process is particularly sensitive in 
Judaism. The Orthodox tradition is deeply concerned with the need to 
obligate the convert before the law, not to have the convert perform a 
bind to which he or she is not obligated. 
Consider, for example, the issue of male circumcision under 
Jewish law. As Zvi Zohar argues, all Israelite males are circumcised 
after birth “[b]ut circumcision does not make them Jews; rather, it is 
only because they are Jews (by birth) that their parents are bound to 
circumcise them.”74 The obligations set down in law are only binding 
on Jews who satisfy the religious criteria, which is based on descent, 
but the descent of persons who are under obligation as understood by 
Jewish law.75 This procedure is replicated in Orthodox conversion 
which includes three prescribed components: “the physical acts that 
constitute the formal conversion ritual, the conversion candidate’s 
acceptance of God’s commandments, and the participation of the 
Rabbinical Court, which formally accepts the convert into the 
community of Israel.”76 The acceptance of the commandments as a 
religious and spiritual commitment, however, occurs prior to the 
obligation to immerse in a ritual bath and circumcise (for males) and 
“is the principal component of the conversion; indeed, it is the very 
essence of the conversion. True conversion is, first and foremost, an 
intense spiritual and religious transformation that takes place in the 
convert’s personality.77 It is the religious element of accepting the 
commandments upon oneself, that replays the original covenant on 
Sinai, that has become the normative Orthodox halakhah, which then 
obligates the convert in ritual practice. 
While membership of the Jewish people does not require any 
consent if one is accepted under the matrilineal test, conversion into 
Israel does include consent as a binding obligation. The result of a 
 
74. Zvi Zohar, Commitment versus Rebirth, in 2 THE JEWISH POLITICAL 
TRADITION 262, (Michael Walzer et al., eds., 2003).  
75. This is recognized by Lord Brown in dissent: “Unlike proselytizing faiths, 
[Orthodox Jews] … believe that the duty to teach and learn [about the Jewish faith] 
applies only to members of the religion, because the obligations in question bind 
only them.” JFS, [2009] UKSC 15 ¶ 252 (Lord Brown, dissenting).  
76. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, YEVAMOT 47a‒b; MENACHEM FINKELSTEIN, 
CONVERSION: HALAKHAH AND PRACTICE 23 (2007).  
77. FINKELSTEIN, supra note 76, at 49, 163–64. 
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spiritual and religious acceptance of the commandments brings with 
it the obligation to perform those commandments. However, 
acceptance, ritual and participation of the Rabbinical Court are all 
required to formalize obligation of law on the individual in relation to 
God and Klal Yisrael. While this process is repeated in the case of a 
Masorti conversion,78 owing to their denial of direct revelation 
Orthodox Judaism rejects the authority of the Masorti Bet Din 
(religious court) and consequently questions the strength and rigor of 
its halakhic observance. 
What is remarkable about the majority judgment is the clarity 
with which Lord Phillips claims to have seen into the issues of 
membership of the Jewish people, its attitude to gentiles and the 
conversion of non-Jews into Israel. Lord Phillips’ commencement of 
his leading opinion with a passage from Deuteronomy (7: 1-4) serves 
rather to provide proof of the attitude of Jews to gentiles and 
intermarriage:  
Neither shall you make marriages with them; thy 
daughter thou shalt not give unto his sons, nor his 
daughter shalt thou take unto thy sons. For he will turn 
away thy son from following me, that they may serve 
other gods.” (7: 3-4)79	  	  
Lord Phillips’ opening hermeneutic seriously underplays the 
interpretive task that such an inquiry demands. While there are good 
reasons to return to the Biblical text, that text itself is not auto-
interpreting and requires consideration of texts and commentary 
developed over hundreds of years in order to gain an appreciation of 
the complexities that surround membership, prohibition of 
intermarriage and conversion.80 The reading that Lord Phillips draws 
 
78. Masorti conversion includes: “1. mastery of a body of knowledge; 2. a 
familiarity with and observance of a range of Jewish ritual obligations including 
Shabbat, Kashrut and participation in the prayer‒life of the Synagogue; and 3. a 
spiritual connection and a theological commitment to Jewish peoplehood and 
Jewish belief”. New London Synagogue, Conversion, 
http://www.newlondon.org.uk/page.a 
sp?page_id=16.	  
79.  In making this opening interpretive move, the Court can be seen to decide 
not only what about doctrine is essentially a religious matter (see supra note 34) 
but also “which authoritative texts are relevant to making such a determination.” 
See Agrama, supra note 5, at 503. 
80. See, e.g., MARTIN GOODMAN, MISSION AND CONVERSION: PROSELYTISING 
IN THE RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE (1994); DAVID NOVAK, THE 
IMAGE OF THE NON‒JEW IN JUDAISM: A HISTORICAL AND CONSTRUCTIVE STUDY OF 
THE NOAHIDE LAWS (2011); FINKELSTEIN supra note 76; DAVID ELLENSON & 
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on is in fact taken from the Babylonian Talmud Kiddushin 68b and 
Rabbi Shlomo Yitzchak’s (Rashi) commentary on Deuteronomy 
7:4.81 The argument is terse and complex, relying on the exact 
wording of the text and what both “he will turn aside” and “thy son” 
refers to in 7:4. The Sages interpret the “he” in “he will turn aside” to 
mean the pagan male married to the Israelite female; consequently, 
the son of this pairing will be “thy son,” i.e. Jewish and capable of 
being turned aside and corrupted by foreign gods. Because the text 
does not also say “she will turn aside” it is considered coherent that 
the marriage between a Jewish male and pagan female is not “thy 
son;” hence the offspring is not Jewish. This interchange between the 
Talmud and Rashi stretches over hundreds of years and is not the 
only text that one can draw on to understand the relations between 
Israel and gentile. While Lord Phillips is correct in stating that 
descent criteria and Jewish marriages are important aspects of all 
Jewish traditions, the reasons for accepting these restrictions is not 
addressed. 
If one were, for example, to compare Deuteronomy 7:1-4 to the 
infamous story of Pinchas in Numbers 25:1-15 which finds Israel 
profaning itself with Moabite women and attaching itself to the cult 
of Baal-Peor, the reasoning in both passages is consistent. Prohibition 
on marriage is not for racial reasons, rather to prevent Israel from 
turning to other gods. The Talmudic commentary on Numbers 25:1-
15 does not appear to find fault in intermixing and the sexual act 
itself, but rather is concerned with the motive behind the relations. 
Sexual desires lead to sacrifice and attachment to Baal-Peor (the 
physical act itself being seen as a form of worship) and finally to 
rejecting the God of Israel and the teachings of Moses.82 The whole 
episode is linked to the earlier rivalry between Moab, Midian and 
Israel (Number 22:1-35) and Balak’s wish to curse Israel through the 
prophet Balaam. When this fails, Balaam is interpreted as advising 
the elders of Moab to use sexual desire to undermine Israel and turn 
them away from the God of Israel.83 
 
DANIEL GORDIS, PLEDGES OF JEWISH ALLEGIANCE: CONVERSION, LAW, AND 
POLICYMAKING IN NINETEENTH‒ AND TWENTIETH‒CENTURY ORTHODOX 
RESPONSA (2012). 
81. CHUMASH WITH RASHI’S COMMENTARY 40–41, 192–93 (Rabbi A.M. 
Silbermann trans., 1934).  
82. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, SANHEDRIN, 106A.  
83. RAMBAN (MOSES NACHMANIDES), COMMENTARY ON THE TORAH (Charles 
B. Chavel, trans. 1976), Numbers 25:1. 
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A wider reading of the Torah discloses the religious reasoning 
behind these prohibitions. Ethnic or “racial” aspects of nationhood 
are secondary to the religious commitment to Torah and the God of 
Israel. The tacit assumption in JFS is that while for Judaism the case 
turns on these issues, British law need not concern itself with such 
matters as they can be subsumed under the category of subjective 
motive or, more problematically, not regarded as essentially 
“religious” at all provided discrimination can be proved and the 
“factual criteria” or “grounds” upon which such discrimination 
occurs is held to be subject to the jurisdiction of the RRA 1976. The 
acknowledgement of reliance on ethnic criteria or descent is 
sufficient to make this judgment.  
With regards to conversion, the question of where and how to 
apply neutrality is again raised. Should the Court apply norms of fair 
treatment to the conversion criteria of religious groups, or to M as an 
autonomous agent, or to the conversion practice itself? For the 
majority, the matrilineal test in Judaism clearly contains descent-
based criteria which examine the ethnic origins of the applicant and 
this test is also applied in conversion. There are, of course, ethnic or 
racial attitudes that can be referenced in ancient, medieval and 
modern commentators,84 but what should be more relevant to the JFS 
case is that the mainstream of Jewish Orthodoxy has adopted a 
reasoned approach to conversion which judges converts not on their 
ethnic origins but on the strength of their commitment to the Jewish 
people and Jewish law.85 Conversions are judged on religious 
reasons—“for the sake of Heaven”—and ulterior motives (such as 
conversion for marriage or wealth) are treated with suspicion; 
however, once the strength of commitment is tested, there is some 
degree of flexibility regarding reasons for conversion. 
One of the key reasons for confusion in the majority judgments 
and the case generally is that a clear distinction between racial and 
non-racial grounds cannot be made owing to Judaism being entangled 
with ethnic criteria.86 For Lord Phillips and the majority, Judaism 
may indeed be termed a “religion,” but it is a religion that cannot be 
subsumed under a non-racial category while membership rests on the 
 
84. Ezra 9; JUDAH HALEVI, THE KUZARI: AN ARGUMENT FOR THE FAITH OF 
ISRAEL 115 (1964). 
85.  MISHNAH YEVAMOT 2:4; BABYLONIAN TALMUD, YEVAMOT 24B; 
MAIMONIDES, THE CODE OF MAIMONIDES, BOOK FIVE: THE BOOK OF HOLINESS, 
(Louis I. Rabinowitz and Philip Grossman trans., 1965), Chapter 14; FINKELSTEIN 
supra note 76, at 221‒83. 
86. JFS, [2009] UKSC 15, ¶ 41. 
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mother’s line and the descent thereof. In this sense, Judaism may be 
considered a religion, but in effect an “unlawful religion” under the 
RRA 1976 definition of unlawful grounds. Jewish conversion criteria 
also examine the ethnic origins of the mother’s line and for this 
reason are similarly considered to be acts of racial or ethnic 
discrimination.87 Consequently, Judaism itself and the matrilineal test 
that supports conversion are not lawful “non-racial” grounds under 
the RRA 1976. As Lady Hale states: 
M was rejected because of his mother’s ethnic origins, 
which were Italian and Roman Catholic. The fact that 
the Office of the Chief Rabbi would have over-looked 
his mother’s Italian origins, had she converted to 
Judaism in a procedure which they would recognise, 
makes no difference to this fundamental fact. M was 
rejected, not because of who he is, but because of who 
his mother is . . . it was because his mother was not 
descended in the matrilineal line from the original 
Jewish people that he was rejected. This was because 
of his lack of descent from a particular ethnic group. 
In this respect, there can be no doubt that his ethnic 
origins were different from those of the pupils who 
were admitted. It was not because of his religious 
beliefs. The school was completely indifferent to 
these. They admit pupils who practise all 
denominations of Judaism, or none at all, or even 
other religions entirely, as long as they are 
halachically Jewish, descended from the original 
Jewish people in the matrilineal line.88 
By their interpretation of the category of direct racial 
discrimination established in the RRA 1976, and the refusal to allow 
any justification or balancing of rights under British 
antidiscrimination law, the majority comprehends lawful religion in 
an antinomian fashion that fails to apprehend any positive 
comprehension of nationhood in relation to Jewish law. The result is 
that Jewish law is required to justify its religious status in 
contradistinction to its unlawful association with ethnicity rather than 
to open up any consideration of this a priori conception of religion 
itself. To understand what Judaism considers itself to be as a nation 
bound by the Sinaitic covenant would require thoughtful inquiry and 
 
87. Id. ¶ 46.  
88. Id. ¶ 66. 
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a deep understanding of the relationship between election, covenant, 
commandments, the written and the oral law. 
In conclusion, when a legal discourse such as that used in the 
JFS case discusses Judaism in terms of internal belief or subjective 
motive that can and ought to be separated from ethnicity for reasons 
of equality and fair treatment, it is clear that the legal definition of 
religion is incompatible with Judaism and either seeks to regulate the 
scope of religion in general or fails to be aware of fundamental 
differences in religious traditions which the law of religious freedom 
is commonly understood to protect. 
II.  MODERN SECULAR POWER AND THE RIGHT TO RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM 
In his classic Foreword to the 1982 Supreme Court Term Nomos 
and Narrative, Robert Cover’s target of critique was the then recent 
case of Bob Jones University v. United States which raised for 
decision the question whether a religious school discriminating on the 
basis of race could be denied tax-exempt status by the IRS.89 Lord 
Hope cites Bob Jones in JFS stating that “[b]eliefs of that kind are 
not worthy of respect in a democratic society or compatible with 
human dignity.”90  
Cover’s concern, however, was the deeper relationship under the 
American Constitution between freedom and order and, in particular, 
the violence of imposed order on the ways of life of plural 
communities. It was this concern that animated his distinctive idea of 
a nomos—a normative world—where law and narrative are 
inseparably related and where the creation of legal meaning— 
“jurisgenesis”—takes place through an “essentially cultural 
medium.” Cover’s argument pointed to the essentially dialectic 
nature of legal reasoning and the recognition that all normative 
worlds have something in common: they contain co-existing ideal-
typical patterns of combining corpus, discourse and interpersonal 
commitment—one a paideic mode of “world creating,” the other an 
imperial mode of “world maintaining.”91 
 
89.  103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983). As a white, fundamentalist Christian university, 
Bob Jones University had revoked its rule denying admission to unmarried 
African‒Americans when threatened with revocation of its favorable tax status by 
the federal government, but it had retained its rule against interracial dating and 
marriage and against any groups advocating these practices. 
90. JFS, [2009] UKSC 15, ¶ 202.  
91. In the “paideic” world of the nomos, law is a resource in the larger effort of 
a community to endow life with meaning. As an ideal‒type, it suggests: “(1) a 
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In the context of American antidiscrimination law, Cover’s 
argument points to persistent tensions in equal protection case law in 
the area of free exercise claims by minority religious groups. It also 
points to the tension between the prevailing norm of the abstract 
individual in the antidiscrimination principle and what Owen Fiss in 
1976 termed the “group-disadvantaging” principle,92 or what is today 
known as the “antisubordination” principle.93 The difficulty with the 
antidiscrimination principle and a formal conception of equality is 
that it inevitably serves as a cloak for a majoritarian conception of the 
good and is thus insensitive to the free exercise claims and collective 
identities of minority groups. Conversely, the difficulty with the 
antisubordination principle and a more substantive conception of 
equality is that it stands in tension with the antidiscrimination 
principle and is thus insensitive to the autonomy claims of members 
of minority groups, claims often brought against those minority 
groups themselves.  
This Article argues that the JFS case represents a collision 
between these two kinds of equality arguments: between the claim of 
M to individual freedom of religion, conscience and belief and the 
right to be free from discriminatory treatment on the one hand and the 
competing claim by JFS to collective freedom of religion and belief 
and the right to discriminate in its admissions policy on that religious 
 
common body of precept and narrative, (2) a common and personal way of being 
educated into this corpus, and (3) a sense of direction or growth that is constituted 
as the individual and his community work out the implications of their law.” This is 
a vision of a “strong community of common obligations” characteristic, for 
example, of Talmudic law and Christian conceptions of the Church where 
reciprocal obligations flow from commitment, not coercion, because people 
recognize the needs of others and respond to them. By contrast, in what Cover 
terms the imperial legal order of the liberal state, norms are “universal and enforced 
by institutions” in the interest of social order and discourse is “premised on 
objectivity—upon that which is external to the discourse itself.” This finds its 
fullest expression in the civil community where “[i]nterpersonal commitments are 
weak, premised only on a minimalist obligation to refrain from the coercion and 
violence that would make impossible the objective mode of discourse and the 
impartial and neutral application of norms.” Robert Cover, The Supreme Court, 
1982 Term—Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983) 
reprinted in NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE AND THE LAW: THE ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER 
105–06 (Martha Minow, Michael Ryan, and Austin Sarat eds. 1995).  
92. Owen Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. 
AFFAIRS 107 (1976). 
93. Owen Fiss, Another Equality, ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP (2004). See 
also the 2003 and 2004 symposium Issues in Legal Scholarship on “The Origins 
and Fate of the Antisubordination Theory” which present a wide range of responses 
to and critiques of Fiss’s original article. 
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basis on the other. While ultimately decided on the basis of racial 
antidiscrimination law, and in particular the distinction between 
formal equality of treatment (direct discrimination) and substantive 
equality of results (indirect discrimination), the three sets of 
judgments provide important insights into how these claims are 
imagined and adjudicated in terms of the right to religious freedom.  
The reasoning in the judgments indirectly relies on the right to 
religious liberty as a technology of secular governance and we see 
how this functions as an integral part of the power of the modern 
nation-state. In particular, the case illustrates what happens when 
religious freedom is understood not as a political relation between the 
state and “religion(s)” per se, but as a right or legal/moral relation 
between the state and an individual legal subject as rights-holder.  
As argued elsewhere,94 what is distinctive about contemporary 
discourse on religious freedom is how the concept of state neutrality 
towards religion is today defined in terms of protecting the right to 
religious liberty while, conversely, both identifying the relevant 
rights-holder and construing the meaning, scope and limitation of the 
right are today answered in terms of competing conceptions of 
“religion” and what it means for the state to treat religion(s) 
“neutrally.” The discourse is able to maintain its simultaneous—but 
ultimately paradoxical—claims to uniqueness (because “neutral” 
towards religion) and universality (because securing the “right” to 
religious freedom) by defining each concept in terms of the other.95 
The oscillating dialectic between secular neutrality and individual 
freedom in turn ensures that the nature of the public sphere, whether 
within a nation-state such as the United Kingdom or in international 
 
94.  See Peter G. Danchin, The Tangled Law and Politics of Religious Freedom, 
10 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 73 (2012); Danchin, Islam in the Secular Nomos, 
supra note 9.  
95. Consider, e.g., the circular reasoning in the ECHR case of Hasan and 
Chaush v. Bulgaria: 
[T]he Court considers … that facts demonstrating a failure by the authorities to 
remain neutral in the exercise of their powers in this domain [of formal registration 
of religious communities] must lead to the conclusion that the State interfered with 
the believers’ freedom to manifest their religion within the meaning of Article 9 of 
the Convention. It recalls that, but for very exceptional cases, the right to freedom 
of religion as guaranteed under the Convention excludes any discretion on the part 
of the State to determine whether religious beliefs or the means used to express 
such beliefs are legitimate. 
¶ 78, Application no. 30985/96, Strasbourg, (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 26, 2000) 
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001‒58921. 
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law, is dynamically related to the scope of the right to religious 
freedom.96 
What we see shared across the judgments in JFS is the upholding 
of the individual’s right to belief while simultaneously employing 
concepts of direct and indirect racial discrimination or more broadly 
the “rights of others” in order to secure the state’s right to intervene 
and regulate the religious practices of its citizens, especially in this 
case of a religious minority. It is critical to see, however, that this 
tension between inviolability and regulation is in fact internal to the 
conceptual structure of the right to religious liberty itself and serves 
to generate the distinctive antinomies and contradictions that we see 
arising in the reasoning of the majority, concurring and dissenting 
judges respectively over its meaning, justification and realization.  
A.   Racial Discrimination and Religious Freedom 
Given the finding in the case that JFS had directly (for the 
majority) or indirectly (for the concurrence) discriminated against M 
on racial grounds, the first puzzle is the relationship between the 
RRA 1976 and the right to freedom of religion and belief protected 
under Article 9 of the Human Rights Act 1998.97 The judges are 
largely silent on this issue despite it having been raised in argument 
before the Court by both JFS and E and several interveners.98 
Although the brief of JFS is not publically available, several of 
the other briefs submitted during the proceedings make clear that JFS 
raised at least two claims regarding the right to religious liberty. First, 
that “a school is entitled to prefer to give priority to children who are 
members of the faith, as defined by that religion [which is] a matter 
for that religion, not for the State, under Article 9”.99 Second, that 
holding the matrilineal test to be a test of racial and/or ethnic origins 
would lead to “less favourable treatment of Jews compared with other 
 
 96.  See Danchin, Islam in the Secular Nomos, supra note 9. 
97. Courts are required to interpret primary legislation so as to ensure 
compatibility with Convention rights. Where such interpretation is impossible, 
however, judges may not overturn Acts of Parliament for being inconsistent with 
Convention rights, but may issue a declaration of incompatibility leaving it to 
remedial orders or the ordinary legislative process to remedy the inconsistency. 
Human Rights Act, 1998, c.42 (UK) §§ 3‒4. 
98. In addition to E and JFS, the major interveners in the case were the Board 
of Deputies of British Jews, the Secretary of State for Education, the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission, and the British Humanist Association.  
99.  Brief for E ¶ 25, R(E) v. Governing Body of JFS, [2009] UKSC 15 (UKSC 
2009/0105).  
458 MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [VOL. 29:419 
religions”.100 Both claims raised for consideration the meaning, scope 
and possible grounds of limitation on the right to religious freedom in 
conjunction with the demands of state neutrality toward religion(s).  
In support of these claims, the brief of the Board of Deputies 
pointed to the Article 9 jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights to emphasize the importance of the right to religious 
freedom and the demands of state neutrality in allowing religious 
communities to constitute themselves.101 The brief argued that E’s 
submission, that the RRA 1976 was a proportionate interference with 
the right of JFS to manifest religion, was circular because it assumed 
the very thing at issue: i.e. “what should be encompassed within the 
scope of race discrimination.”102 The decision of the Court of Appeal 
further violated the right to equality under Article 14 because it 
disproportionality burdened Judaism as against other religions.103 
 
100. Id. ¶ 26; Brief for Intervener, Board of Deputies of British Jews ¶ 28, 
R(E) v. Governing Body of JFS, [2009] UKSC 15 (UKSC 2009/0105).  
101. Brief of Board of Deputies of British Jews ¶ 22–26, R(E) v. Governing 
Body of JFS, [2009] UKSC 15 (UKSC 2009/0105). The brief cites the leading case 
of Kokkinakis v. Greece [1993] 17 EHHR 397, ¶ 31 to argue that the right to 
manifest one’s “religion or belief in worship, teaching, practice and observance,” 
while not unqualified, is “one of the foundations if a ‘democratic society’”. The 
Court’s Article 9 jurisprudence has been “robust where it concerns direct 
interferences by the state with the internal affairs of religious organizations: see, 
e.g., Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia v. Moldova (2002) 35 EHRR 306; Hasan 
and Chaush v. Bulgaria (2002) 34 EHRR 55.” This is especially so where, as here, 
“differences arise within different groups of the same religion.” Brief of Board of 
Deputies of British Jews, ¶ 24, R(E) v. Governing Body of JFS, [2009] UKSC 15 
(UKSC 2009/0105). In such cases where religious pluralism is at stake, “in 
exercising its regulatory power in this sphere in its relations with the various 
religions, denominations and beliefs, the State has a duty to remain neutral and 
impartial” (citing Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia, ¶ 116 (emphasis added in 
brief)). Furthermore, “[o]bserving that religious communities traditionally exist in 
the form of organized structures, the Court has repeatedly found that the 
autonomous existence of religious communities is indispensable for pluralism in a 
democratic society and is, thus, an issue at the very heart of the protection which 
Article 9 affords” Id. (citing Löffelmann v. Austria, Application No. 42967/98, 12 
March 2009, ¶ 47). 
102. Id. ¶ 27, 29.  
103. Id. ¶ 28–30. The brief argued that the “consequence of the Court of 
Appeal’s approach if upheld is that it would be unlawful for an oversubscribed 
Jewish school to give priority to children who are Jewish according to the criteria if 
any of the denominations of the Jewish religion, even though it is lawful for the 
faith schools of other religions to have oversubscription criteria as defined by that 
religion.” Id. ¶ 28. The result is that, “[b]y failing to allow for the different ways in 
which different religions define their own membership, the Court of Appeal’s 
approach fails to respect the principle established in Thlimmenos v. Greece: ‘The 
right not to be discriminated against in the enjoyment of the rights guaranteed 
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These arguments were further supported in the intervening brief of 
the Secretary of State.104 
The brief of E made two arguments in response. First, that 
Article 9(2) allows for legitimate limitations on the “right of Jews 
(and Orthodox Jews) . . . to manifest their religion” and that the RRA 
1976 is “plainly a proportionate interference with the right to 
manifest religion, necessary in order to protect the fundamental rights 
of others, including the right of a child not to suffer race 
discrimination, and the rights of the parent and the child to access to 
education in accordance with their beliefs and preferences, without 
discrimination.”105 Second, that a correct reading of the Human 
Rights Act 1998 favors E on the basis that Article 2 of Protocol 1, 
read together with Article 14, disfavors “an entrance criterion 
privileging members of a religion defined wholly or predominantly 
by reference to their membership of an ethnic group or their status 
from birth, and entirely without regard to the religious convictions of 
the children or parents themselves”.106 
 
under the convention is also violated when states without an objective and 
reasonable justification fail to treat differently persons whose situations are 
significantly different.’” Id. ¶ 30 (emphasis added in brief) (quoting 31 Eur. H.R. 
Rep 411, ¶ 44 (2000)). 
104. The Secretary of State observed that the “statutory regime covering 
religious discrimination contains carefully carved‒out exceptions, which do not 
apply to race discrimination, but which permit less favourable treatment on grounds 
of religion in particular situations.” This permission to “confer benefits and 
services only on members of their religion …. [was] intended to apply to all major 
religions.” Consequently, “if Parliament had permitted Muslim, Christian or Hindu 
bodies to confer benefits or offer services to those they regard as members of their 
religions, but rendered it unlawful for Jewish and Sikh bodies to do so, that might 
constitute a breach of European Convention on Human Rights Articles 9 and 14. It 
would interfere with the freedom to manifest religion in a way that is 
discriminatory.” Brief of the Secretary of State ¶ 45 R(E) v. Governing Body of 
JFS, [2009] UKSC 15 (UKSC 2009/0105). 
105. Brief of E, supra note 99, ¶¶ 24, 167.  
106. Article 2 of the First Protocol to the ECHR provides as follows: “No 
person shall be denied the right to education. In the exercise of any functions which 
it assumes in relation to education and to teaching, the State shall respect the right 
of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own 
religious and philosophical convictions.” European Convention on Human Rights, 
protocol 1, art. 2, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, E.T.S. 5. For E, the focus of this 
article is on “the rights of the child to education; and of the parents to education for 
their child in accordance with their religious beliefs. It is not a mandate for a school 
to give priority to children who have no religious faith, because of a status 
conferred on them at birth, and to deprive families who practice a particular faith 
of the choice of access to education in accordance with that faith.” Brief of E, 
supra note 99, ¶ 164 (our emphasis).  
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In support of these arguments, the British Humanist Association 
argued that while oversubscription criteria that truly relate to 
“religious convictions or faith” can be permissible, a criterion that 
looks at matrilineage – “which has no necessary bearing on religious 
convictions or faith” – is not.107 For the purposes of both the RRA 
1976 and Human Rights Act 1998, there was thus no objective or 
reasonable justification for the latter.108  
Before proceeding to consider the reasoning in the judgments, it 
is important to notice the structural dialectic between neutrality and 
right that indelibly shapes the competing argumentative positions of 
the parties and how, in particular, each concept is defined in terms of 
the other. Thus the arguments raised by JFS concerning the scope and 
meaning of the right to religious liberty (membership of a religious 
tradition is an essentially religious matter which is for the religion, 
not the state, to decide) are responded to by M with arguments 
concerning state neutrality (the RRA 1976 is a neutral law of general 
application) and justified limitations on the right to manifest religion 
to protect the rights of others (M and E have a fundamental right to 
be free from racial and ethnic discrimination in those spheres 
regulated by the RRA 1976). Conversely, the arguments raised by 
JFS concerning the lack of state neutrality (discriminatory treatment 
towards Orthodox Jews and Judaism compared with other religions 
under the RRA 1976) is responded to by M with arguments 
concerning the scope and meaning of the right to religious liberty (the 
right properly interpreted does not include the freedom to apply 
criteria such as matrilineage in a school’s admissions policy which 
has no necessary bearing on religious conviction or faith).  
It is also important to notice how JFS and M mirror each other in 
the claims they make regarding direct and indirect discrimination. For 
JFS, the application of the RRA 1976 directly discriminates against 
Judaism as a religion by interfering with its essential religious criteria 
for determining membership. Further, even if the RRA 1976 is 
applied equally to all persons it indirectly discriminates against Jews 
as a religious minority by treating them less favorably when 
compared with persons of other religious traditions. For M by 
contrast, the application of the matrilineal test by JFS directly 
 
107. Brief of the British Humanist Association, ¶ 47 R(E) v. Governing Body 
of JFS, [2009] UKSC 15 (UKSC 2009/0105). Under the matrilineal test, “children 
would be admitted by virtue of their ‘membership’ (as maternally defined) even if 
they were atheists or indeed practiced another faith, whereas practicing Jews who 
(like E) did not qualify as members would be excluded”). Id. ¶ 20. 
108. Id. ¶ 39. 
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discriminates against M and E on grounds of race and ethnicity. 
Further, even if the criteria applied by JFS is religious rather than 
racial and its application is held to be permissible religious 
discrimination, this indirectly discriminates against M and E (and 
“ethnic” Jews in general identified by the Mandla criteria) by putting 
them at a particular disadvantage when compared to persons regarded 
as Jewish by the OCR on the basis of matrilineal descent.  
Interestingly, none of the judgments seriously engage these 
competing conceptions of the meaning of and relationship between 
the right to religious liberty and the demands of neutrality. For the 
reasons discussed in Part I, the majority judgment appears simply to 
assume, without argument, that the section 1(1)(a) of the RRA 1976 
is compatible with Article 9 of the Human Rights Act. The 
assumption is that an alleged discriminator may hold a belief or 
adhere to values based on racial or ethnic descent-based criteria for 
any reason, religious or not, as absolutely protected by the right to 
freedom of religion, conscience and belief in the so-called forum 
internum of Article 9(1). But to the extent those “factual” criteria 
become the grounds for discriminatory treatment directed towards 
another in a sphere subject to civil jurisdiction, that treatment is 
unlawful under the RRA 1976 and no benign motive or religious 
reasons can be advanced to alter that conclusion. On this basis, the 
practice of Orthodox, and potentially any form of, Judaism in a 
sphere subject to racial antidiscrimination law is unlawful.109  
Only Lord Mance amongst the majority judges seeks to justify 
this reasoning in relation to the right to religious freedom. Lord 
Mance beings by noting that the “freedom to manifest one’s religion 
or beliefs is . . . subject to such limitations as are prescribed by law 
and are necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others.”110 He then makes clear that it is the 
rights of M and M’s parents to freedom and autonomy, as opposed to 
those of JFS, that are central in the case: 
 
109. “The decision of the majority means that there can in future be no Jewish 
faith schools which give preference to children because they are Jewish according 
to Jewish religious law and belief”. JFS, [2009] UKSC 15, ¶ 226 (Lord Rodger, 
dissenting). Id. ¶ 248 (Lord Brown, dissenting). See also Lord Brown: “If the 
argument succeeds it follows that Jewish religious law as to who is a Jew (and as to 
what forms of conversion should be recognized) must henceforth be treated as 
irrelevant. Jewish schools in future, if oversubscribed, must decide on preference 
by reference only to outward manifestations of religious practice.”  
110. Id. ¶ 90. 
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Under the United Nations Convention on the Rights of 
the Child 1989, article 3, it is the best interests of the 
child which the United Kingdom is obliged to treat as 
a primary consideration. Under Protocol 1, article 2 to 
the [European Convention], it is the right of parents to 
ensure education and teaching in conformity with their 
own religions and philosophical convictions that the 
state must ensure. . . To treat as determinative the 
view of others . . . that a child is not Jewish by reason 
of his ancestry is to give effect not to the individuality 
or interests of the applicant, but to the viewpoint, 
religiously and deeply held though it be, of the school 
applying the less favourable treatment. That does not 
seem to me either consistent with the scheme or 
appropriate in the context of legislation designed to 
protect individuals from discrimination.111 
For the concurring and dissenting judges, however, the ground of 
decision by JFS to exclude M was found to be wholly religious and 
thus did not constitute direct racial discrimination under the RRA 
1976. This left open the question of indirect racial discrimination 
which fell into two parts: (1) did the policy put persons of the same 
race or ethnic or national origins as M at a particular disadvantage 
when compared with other persons; and, if so, (2) can JFS show that 
the policy was a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate 
aim?112  
B.    Indirect Racial Discrimination, Legitimate Aim and 
Proportionality 
As discussed in Part I.C, on this understanding of the category of 
“religious grounds” the matrilineal descent test was held not 
automatically to be unlawful in its application to treatment of others 
in a sphere subject to the jurisdiction of the RRA 1976. Rather, the 
law of indirect discrimination required JFS and the OCR to advance 
reasons why the particular disadvantage suffered by M in being 
refused admission to the school was the result of a policy which both 
had a “legitimate aim” and was applied as a “proportionate means” of 
achieving that aim.  
 
111. Id. 
112. Id. ¶ 205 (Lord Hope, concurring). 
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The first part of the indirect discrimination test was largely 
conceded by Lord Pannick QC in his submissions on behalf of JFS.113 
Similarly, the concept of “legitimate aim” was uncontroversial 
between the concurring and dissenting judgments. For Lord Hope, 
agreeing with the reasons given by Lord Brown, JFS had a legitimate 
aim because a “faith school is entitled to pursue a policy which 
promotes the religious principles that underpin its faith” on the 
justification that “those who practise the faith or are members of it 
will best promote the religious ethos of the school.”114 But the 
differences in reasoning in interpreting the concept of proportionality 
are what provide the second critical point of divergence in the case.  
For the concurring judges, the question of proportionality 
required JFS to show that it had balanced the effects of its admission 
policy on M against that which was needed to achieve the legitimate 
aim of its policy. Had JFS, for example, considered whether less 
discriminatory means could have been adopted which would not 
undermine the religious ethos of the school, for example, by 
“admitting children recognized as Jewish by any of the branches of 
Judaism, including those who are were Masorti, Reform or 
Liberal”?115 
For Lord Hope, there was not sufficient evidence that “the 
school’s governing body addressed their minds to the impact that 
applying the policy would have on M and comparing it with the 
impact on the school.”116 Implicit in this balancing analysis is an 
assessment of the harms imposed by the policy on the valuable life 
choices and autonomy of M and his parents by comparison to the 
unchosen, arguably even irrational, benefits accorded to children 
recognized as Jewish by the OCR on the basis of their descent along 
the matrilineal line.117 On this basis, Lord Hope and Lord Walker 
 
113. “[I]t is clear that M and all other children who are not of Jewish ethnic 
origin in the maternal line, together with those whose ethnic origin is entirely non‒
Jewish, were placed at a disadvantage by the oversubscriptions policy when 
compared with those who are of Jewish ethnic origin in the maternal line.” Id. 
(Lord Hope, concurring).  
114. Id. ¶ 209 (Lord Hope, concurring).  
115. Id. ¶ 212 (Lord Hope, concurring). 
116. Id. ¶ 211 (Lord Hope, concurring). 
117. Thus for Lord Hope, the disparate impact of the policy on children in M’s 
position was “very severe” in excluding them from the “very significant benefit of 
state‒funded education in accordance with their parents’ religious convictions” 
whereas by contrast “there are alternatives for children recognized by the OCR 
although many in the advantaged group do not share the school’s faith‒based 
reason for giving them priority.” Id. Cf. Rubens, supra note 12, at 406-07. 
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found that JFS had failed to show that its admissions policy, as 
applied in M’s case, was proportionate. 
For the dissenting judges, by contrast, the policy was found to be 
proportionate to the school’s legitimate aim of instilling “Jewish 
values into children who are Jewish in the eyes of Orthodoxy.”118 For 
Lord Brown, this was for two main reasons. First, there was no 
material difference between JFS’s admissions policy and that adopted 
in Muslim or Catholic schools where those who are born Muslim or 
have been baptized are given preference.119 Second, another policy 
based on adherence or commitment to Judaism would not be a means 
of achieving JFS’s aims as it would produce a school with an entirely 
different ethos.120 Apart from running counter to the school’s central 
aim, such a policy would also be “fraught with difficulty”. In a 
striking final paragraph, Lord Brown concludes as follows: 
Quite how such a policy will be formulated and 
applied on a consistent basis is not easy to discern. 
That said, I regard it as altogether preferable to the 
new policy presently dictated by the Court of Appeal’s 
judgment: the imposition of a test for admission to an 
Orthodox Jewish school which is not Judaism’s own 
test and which requires a focus (as Christianity does) 
on outward acts of religious practice and declarations 
of faith, ignoring whether the child is or is not Jewish 
as defined by Orthodox Jewish law.121 
What is striking about the reasoning of the concurring and 
dissenting judgments regarding indirect racial discrimination is how 
closely it mirrors classic liberal rights-based discourse with its 
associated notions of balancing, proportionality, legitimacy, and least 
restrictive means. While articulated using the categories of 
antidiscrimination law, the judges indirectly weigh competing claims 
to religious freedom against the disparate impact caused by 
discriminatory treatment based on grounds of ethnicity or national 
origin. 
 
118. Id. ¶ 233 (Lord Rodger, dissenting). 
119. Cf. id. ¶ 69 (Lady Hale) (“Other religions allow infants to be admitted as a 
result of their parents’ decision. But they do not apply an ethnic criterion to those 
parents. The Christian Church will admit children regardless of who their parents 
are.”) Cf. Rubens, supra note 12, at 398-401. 
120. Id. ¶ 255 (Lord Brown, dissenting).  
121. Id. ¶ 258. Cf. Rubens, supra note 12, at 415-16. 
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Thus the legitimacy of the aims pursued by JFS must implicitly 
include consideration of any religious doctrine, belief or practice 
protected by the right to religious liberty. Similarly, the 
proportionality of the impact of JFS’s admissions policy on M must 
include the effect of that treatment on M’s right to freedom of 
religion, conscience and belief. The obvious difficulty for the Court is 
that both M and JFS can in this way advance legitimate claims to 
religious freedom, albeit claims with different logics, meaning and 
scope. The question then is how a court is to adjudicate between such 
claims in a manner that is both neutral towards religion while at the 
same time guaranteeing the universal human right to religious 
freedom.  
Again, what is noticeable is the extent to which the judges 
indirectly consider these claims through the lens of autonomy and 
choice, whether of M or his mother to choose a particular form of 
Judaism or of JFS to follow or prescribe its own norms of religious 
identity and membership. Implicit in the proportionality analysis of 
the concurrence is that neither JFS nor the OCR have considered or 
taken seriously enough the right of M and his mother to undergo a 
Masorti as opposed to an Orthodox conversion. This failure is tacitly 
weighed against the right of JFS in devising its admissions policy to 
follow the advice of the OCR in basing the criteria for membership 
on Orthodox Jewish religious law.  
The logical implication of this line of reasoning is that indirect 
racial discrimination in the form of application of the matrilineal 
descent test as required by Orthodox Jewish religious law might 
legally be justified if found to be a proportionate means of achieving 
a legitimate aim. But the criteria used by the concurring and 
dissenting judges to make this assessment derives not from any 
putatively factually-based analysis premised on immutable 
characteristics but from a reason-based jurisprudence premised on the 
values of individual freedom and autonomy. 
The freedom of choice of both M and JFS is thus subject to what 
we might term the rational constraints of reason as calibrated by the 
concurring and dissenting judges themselves through consideration of 
the competing rights claims at issue. The judges thus necessarily 
assess the reasonableness of the orthodox religious legal criteria 
employed by the OCR and governors of the school when they ask 
whether the employment of such criteria in the school’s admissions 
policy is a legitimate aim and the effects of the policy on children 
such as M are proportional to the ends sought. As we discuss below, 
this necessarily results in judicial intervention– albeit indirectly, 
466 MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [VOL. 29:419 
unlike the majority— into the forum internum of Jewish religious law 
and belief.  
The critical question that follows is what the normative criteria 
internal to legal reasoning are that allow such judgments to be made? 
The concurring judges suggest that it was open to JFS and thus more 
“reasonable” to include all branches of Judaism in its definition of 
who is a Jew for admissions purposes. The rationale for this 
proposition is that the criteria for membership based on the twin tests 
of matrilineal descent and orthodox conversion are insufficiently 
pluralistic and inclusive. But what exactly is the normative 
justification for this conclusion? Some anterior conception of 
freedom must be assumed as a standard for judgment, one that not 
only privileges autonomy as the highest value but privileges 
individual over collective autonomy.  
In a similar fashion, the dissenting judges pursue a tacit liberal 
strategy of rights-based reasoning but, in doing so, reach the opposite 
conclusion. The opinion of Lord Brown adopts a more self-
consciously internal point of view as regards Orthodox religious legal 
practices and norms. This serves to generate a more sensitive grasp of 
the competing normativities at issue and leads to traditional 
principles of judicial abstention and negative liberty in recognition of 
the dangers of transgressing the limits of statist legal authority. Lord 
Brown thus seeks both to justify, or at a minimum leave undisturbed, 
the authority of the OCR to interpret its own religious legal norms, 
even if this fails to address the harm caused to the valuable choices of 
M.122 
In this set of moves, negative freedom is extended on 
associational grounds to JFS, the OCR and United Synagogue. M is 
now viewed as having chosen an unrecognized conversion process 
while at the same time being recognized to remain free to convert 
under Orthodox auspices if he so chooses. As an intrinsically 
“religious question,” this raises issues of religious freedom not only 
 
122. Lord Brown observes: 
[There is] much debate within the Jewish community about the proper 
standards to apply to conversion and many would like JFS to [admit] 
anyone recognized as Jewish by any of the denominations. M’s real 
complaint here is that in deciding who is a Jew the OCR’s approach to 
conversion is misguided. That, however, is not an issue which is, or ever 
could be, before the Court. No court would ever intervene on such a 
question or dictate who, as a matter of orthodox religious law, is to be 
regarded as Jewish.  
Id. ¶ 239 (Lord Brown, dissenting).  
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for M but also for JFS and the OCR. In recognition of the normative 
complexity of these competing claims, the dissenting judges self-
limit their authority and purport to abstain from any legal judgment 
on what they view as a matter of both internal Jewish religious 
doctrine and intra-religious dispute between Jewish groups. 
C.    Pluralizing the Right to Freedom of Religion and Belief 
The different forms of indirect discrimination reasoning in the 
concurring and dissenting judgments and the contrast between these 
taken together and the direct discrimination reasoning of the majority 
can be seen to illustrate three dominant themes which recur 
constantly in discourse regarding the right to religious freedom. The 
first is the indeterminacy of the foundational distinction at the heart 
of the right between a forum internum said to be absolutely immune 
from state interference and a forum externum viewed as subject to 
rational state regulation and limitation. The second is the ambiguity 
of the subject of the right and the issue whether religious groups and 
institutions may assert claims to associational autonomy. The third is 
the question of the conflict of rights and the twin crises of authority 
and legitimacy when courts must adjudicate between competing 
claims internal to the right to religious liberty, i.e. when both parties 
to a dispute assert a right to freedom of religion or belief. Let us 
consider each of these themes in turn.  
1.   Forum Internum versus Forum Externum 
The most well-entrenched feature of the modern right to 
religious liberty is its bifurcated structure. Contemporary human 
rights provisions such as Article 9 of the ECHR are premised on a 
foundational distinction between the right to “freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion” in Article 9(1) and the right to “manifest 
one’s religion or beliefs” in Article 9(2). The former, referred to as 
the forum internum, is held to be absolute while the latter, the forum 
externum, is said to be subject to limitations where necessary to 
protect public order, morals, or the rights of others. 
What is evident across divergent jurisdictions and in states with 
otherwise distinct religious personalities is how the second clause of 
the right to religious liberty authorizes the state to intervene in what 
appear to be mere expressions of religious belief but in fact involve 
the state in making substantive judgments about religion, a domain 
toward which it claims to be neutral.123 This produces two 
 
123. See Saba Mahmood & Peter G. Danchin, Immunity or Regulation? 
Antinomies of Religious Freedom, 113 SOUTH ATL. Q. 129 (2014).  
468 MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [VOL. 29:419 
paradoxical effects: first, this authorizes the state’s intervention into 
the forum internum which it declares to be autonomous and 
sacrosanct; and second, it privileges the values and commitments of 
the religious majority as the norm against which the religious 
practices of minorities are judged and sanctioned in the forum 
externum.124 Each of these effects is at play in the reasoning in JFS.  
The European Court of Human Rights has long struggled with 
the issue of how to define the content and scope of Article 9(1) and 
its religious liberty jurisprudence unsurprisingly provides no clear 
guidance on the proper object of the protected sphere of the forum 
internum.125 What is of interest for present purposes is how the 
different conceptions advanced in JFS by the majority, concurring 
and dissenting judgments respectively closely track the three main 
approaches that have been adopted by judges on the European 
Court.126  
For the majority, it is autonomously chosen beliefs or 
convictions, religious or not, that are implicitly understood to be the 
proper object of the forum internum.127 As seen in Part I, for Lord 
Phillips religious criteria are subjective, non-factual values or beliefs 
to which a person may choose to assent.128 For the concurring judges, 
however, the relevant category is something closer to conscience or 
faith, understood in some unspecified sense as unchosen, as a matter 
of Orthodox religious law.129 Finally, for the dissenting judges it is 
implicit that JFS and the OCR as collective subjects have the right to 
profess and maintain a discursive religious tradition free of sovereign 
interference, even if this fails to address harms caused to members 
internal to the tradition itself.130 
 
124.  Id. at 130. 
125.  Id. at 145–47. 
126. Cf. Danchin, Islam in the Secular Nomos, supra note 9, at 675–82 
(discussing this aspect of the Court’s Article 9 jurisprudence). 
127. Contrary to the concurrence, recall that the majority rejects the relevance 
of motive or reasons in determining whether the criterion for a discriminatory 
action is “racial.” The implicit assumption is that the forum internum protects only 
the right to choose one’s beliefs and not the immunity of the beliefs themselves.  
128. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. Recall also Lord Phillip’s 
statement that “[m]embership of a religion or faith indicates some degree of 
conscious affiliation with the religion or faith on the part of the member.” JFS, 
[2009] UKSC 15, ¶ 44 (Lord Phillips). See supra note 58 and accompanying text.  
129. See supra note 53 and accompanying text (arguing the state of the mind of 
the alleged discriminator cannot be reduced to a mere motive or personal belief but 
must take into account the unique nature of obligation imposed by halakhah).  
130. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. See also infra Part II.B.2. 
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In each of the judgments, no matter how the content and scope of 
the forum internum is demarcated the Court must make substantive 
judgments on what constitutes or falls within the protected category. 
For the majority, there was no interference with the forum internum 
given that JFS and the OCR remained free to belief in the doctrine of 
matrilineal descent; they were restricted, however, in the 
manifestation of their beliefs in the forum externum which was 
legitimately subject to state regulation in the form of statutory 
prohibition of racial and ethnic discrimination. By contrast, for the 
concurring and dissenting judgments the majority approach appears 
to sanction state intervention directly into the forum internum of 
Orthodox Jewish religious law and belief. Rather, JFS has a 
fundamental right to be bound by and follow halakhah; but to the 
extent that manifestation of this right impacts in the forum externum 
upon persons such as M and E having particular ethnic or national 
origins, JFS must justify the reasonableness of its actions. For the 
concurrence, JFS failed to do this and its manifestation of religion 
was thus legitimately subject to limitation to protect the fundamental 
rights of others; but for the dissent, reasonableness required the state 
instead to abstain from adjudication of what it held to be an 
essentially religious matter and, absent a compelling state interest, to 
respect the collective autonomy of JFS and OCR to determine and 
apply its own rules of membership.  
Either explicitly or implicitly then, the reasoning in each 
judgment considers how the restrictions imposed by the RRA 1976 
and Human Rights Act 1998 seem from the internal point of view of 
the category demarcated as “religious.” The paradoxical result is that 
the courts must make determinations that are inescapably entangled 
with and premised on religious criteria and precepts in order to define 
a sphere “free” from state authority—a private space of exception—
which ostensibly limits legislative and other forms of governmental 
authority. This ever shifting and contested process of construction 
and demarcation of the forum internum is an integral part of the 
public order of the state itself.131 
As Hussein Agrama has observed, the ability to control these 
distinctions involves the fashioning of religion as an “object of 
continual management and intervention” and this constitutes a mode 
of discipline not always articulated in the practice of liberal 
governance.132 The reasoning in JFS, however, allows us to see how 
 
131. Mahmood & Danchin, supra note 123, at 147. 
132.  Agrama, supra note 5, at 499.	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such modes of discipline function using the technology of modern 
rights discourse. What becomes clear is that both the subject of the 
right and the scope of freedom it encompasses are indeterminate 
categories. Further, the reasoning in the majority, concurring and 
dissenting judgments alike inescapably entangles conceptions of the 
religious and the secular as part of the state’s power and authority “to 
decide what shall count as essentially religious and what scope it can 
have in social life.” 133	  
This involves two critical determinations. First is the need to 
identify “what about doctrine is essentially a religious matter”.134 As 
discussed in Part I.A and B, the Court’s 5:4 split on whether reliance 
by JFS and the OCR on the matrilineal test is a racial or religious 
ground of decision illustrates this first dilemma. Second is the need to 
distinguish between “the ‘civil’ and ‘religious’ dimensions of an act, 
and on that basis deciding whether the act is enforceable, punishable, 
or otherwise deserving of protection or exemption under the law.”135 
The divergence between the concurring and dissenting judges on 
whether the exclusion of M constituted indirect racial discrimination 
and the ensuing lines of argument concerning the legitimacy of JFS’s 
aim and the proportionality of its means illustrate this second 
dilemma.  
In either case, the Court must make an assessment of the 
religious beliefs at issue. This necessarily generates a “modality of 
suspicion” as the Court considers whether acts or expressions of 
belief are “genuinely religiously motivated” and the nature of the 
“belief” itself.136 What is critical to this liberal algebra is that religion 
be understood essentially as a type of subjective belief as opposed to 
any type of objective knowledge,137 and that it not be allowed to 
 
133.  Id. 503. For this reason, “secularism’s power may lie more in the 
underlying question it continually provokes and obliges us to answer, than in the 
normativity of the categories it proposes.” Id. 500. 
134. Id. 503. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.  
135. Id. 
136. Hussein Ali Agrama, Religious Freedom and the Bind of Suspicion in 
Contemporary Secularity, in POLITICS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (Winnifred Fallers 
Sullivan, Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, Saba Mahmood and Peter Danchin eds., 
forthcoming 2015). A similar phenomenon can be traced in U.S. religious freedom 
jurisprudence where courts routinely determine (1) whether “religious acts or 
expressions are sincerely held to be essential to one’s religion”, and (2) whether 
“these acts and expressions are authorized and mandated by orthodox religious 
texts.” Id (citing WINNIFRED FALLERS SULLIVAN, THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM (2005)).  
137. The “circumscribed sphere of religion already articulates the principle that 
it ought to be separated from material power.” It is this understanding of religion 
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express “material interests or drives towards worldly power” which 
are seen as potentially dangerous or threatening, especially to those 
values foundational to the public order of the state.138  
As discussed in Part I, it is precisely the external, non-faith based 
imperative of matrilineal descent in the Jewish tradition that violates 
these secular imperatives. On the one hand, an unchosen imperative 
is deeply irrational for contradicting the foundational value of 
individual autonomy and, on the other, potentially threatening for 
suggesting a source of ultimate authority other than secular reason 
itself.139 
2.   Individual versus Group or Associational Rights 
The second theme in religious liberty discourse is the proper 
subject of the right. While the majority and concurrence differ on the 
nature of the forum internum, they both agree that the essence of 
religion is to be found in a cognitive or rationalistic framework 
internal to the consciousness of the individual, whether autonomously 
to choose one’s beliefs (for the majority) or to have and maintain a 
certain category of belief (for the concurrence). This conceivably 
includes the fiction of a corporate entity such as JFS viewed as a 
legal subject acting as an individual decision-maker. For the 
dissenting judges, however, the proper subject of the right appears to 
encompass Judaism and Jewish religious practices more broadly 
construed.140  
 
and religious subjectivity that underlies the idea of state neutrality between 
religious and non‒religious but deeply held beliefs. If this were not the case, “it 
would be difficult to argue that the state should remain neutral between belief and 
what it sees as knowledge, especially in matters concerning public order and the 
governance of populations, when that knowledge is considered crucial to such 
governance.” Agrama, supra note 136.  
138. Id. 
139.  In Denbigh High School, it was held that an interference with the right to 
manifest religion would be unlikely to exist where a person has “voluntarily 
accepted an employment or role which does not accommodate that practice or 
observance and there are other means open to practice or observe his or her religion 
without undue hardship of inconvenience.” R(Begum) v. Denbigh High School, 
[2006] UKHL 15, ¶ 23. In its submissions, JFS argued that there were other Jewish 
schools that did not have orthodox rules on conversion which M was free to attend. 
This argument failed, however, because of the finding by the majority that the 
application of the matrilineal test by JFS constituted direct racial discrimination 
under the RRA 1976.  
140. While neither Lord Brown nor Lord Rodger squarely address the question, 
their judgments appear to follow Talal Asad’s conception of religion as a “lived” or 
“discursive” tradition which encompasses a practical mode of living and 
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Over the last few decades, a rich albeit poorly theorized body of 
jurisprudence has been developed under Article 9 of the ECHR in 
which claims to collective religious autonomy have been adjudicated. 
The European Court has held in a series of cases that it has limited 
jurisdiction to review the processes, reasoning or substantive 
decisions made by religious bodies within an area covered by 
religious autonomy.141 In similar terms, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
recently recognized a “ministerial exception” to generally applicable 
employment discrimination laws in the case of EEOC v. Hosanna-
Tabor.  
The premise of such jurisdictional approaches to issues of 
religious autonomy is the notion that it is not for secular courts to 
make determinations on matters “strictly ecclesiastical” or involving 
religious teachings or orthodoxy. This proposition, however, leaves 
open a number of puzzles and dilemmas for the courts. The first 
relates to how the relevant autonomous sphere is to be drawn. If the 
RRA 1976 was intended to apply to religious schools and domains 
such as employment, why should it not apply to the internal activities 
of religious organizations in the case of acts of racial or ethnic 
discrimination? Conversely, if the right to religious freedom is 
interpreted to provide a form of collective immunity to religious 
organizations from legislative intervention in their internal affairs, on 
what basis does the RRA 1976 seek to regulate a religious school 
such as JFS which has the express purpose of effectuating the 
obligation imposed by Jewish religious law to educate those students 
regarded by the OCR as Jewish? Some argument is needed to justify 
this particular demarcation of spheres, an argument which itself must 
be neutral towards religion and respect the right to religious liberty.  
A second dilemma concerns how the state and state law are to 
relate to and recognize actually-existing systems of religious law. 
 
“techniques for teaching body and mind to cultivate specific virtues that have been 
authorized, passed on, and reformulated down the generations.” Talal Asad, Re‒
reading a Modern Classic: W. C. Smith’s ‘The Meaning and End of Religion,’ in 
RELIGION AND THE MEDIA 216 (Hent de Vries & Samuel Weber eds., 2001). The 
danger of adopting a “pietistic conception of religion as faith that is essentially 
individual and otherworldly” is to situate religion ineluctably within a secular 
image of the world. Id. 220. 	  
141. Obst v. Germany, no. 425/03 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Sept. 23, 2010), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=002‒834; Lombardi‒
Valluari v. Italy, no. 39128/05 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 20, 2009), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=003‒2900937‒3189238; 
Scüth v. Germany, no. 1620/03 (Eur Ct. H.R. Sept. 23 2010), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001‒100469. 
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There are a tremendous variety of constitutional arrangements in the 
world today prescribing different forms of relation between the State 
and religion(s)142 and this includes a variety of forms of recognition 
of and formal relation to both majority and minority religions.143 In 
South Africa, for example, section 15(3)(a)(ii) of the post-apartheid 
1996 Constitution expressly contemplates legislation recognizing 
“systems of personal and family law under any tradition, or adhered 
to by persons professing a particular religion.” Various contingent 
forms of legal relation between the State and South Africa’s different 
religious communities, including groups living under customary law 
and religious minorities with their own family and personal status 
laws, have thus been developed through law reform efforts in the 
country over the last two decades.144 
As discussed in Part I, British legal policy towards majority and 
minority religious groups has moved through at least two early 
phases of legislative accommodation and multicultural recognition.145 
But what is striking in JFS is how the courts today are employing 
quasi-constitutional liberal principles and especially classical ideas of 
negative liberty and judicial abstention evident in the dissenting 
judgments to adjudicate these forms of legal relation.  
 
142. On relations between religion and State in various national constitutions, 
see Peter G. Danchin, Of Prophets and Proselytes: Freedom of Religion and the 
Conflict of Rights in International Law 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 249, 297–307 (2008). 
143. Spain and Italy, for example, have established “concordat” systems of 
recognition that provide different rights and privileges to religious communities 
which are characterized by the use of negotiated agreements between the State and 
federations of religious institutions often formed for the purpose of concluding and 
administrating the agreements. Spain has thus concluded agreements with the 
Federation of Evangelical Religious Entities of Spain, the Islamic Commission of 
Spain and the Federation of Israelite Communities of Spain. See Gloria M. Morán, 
The Spanish System of Church and State, 1995 B.Y.U. L. REV. 535, 544 (1995). Italy 
has similarly concluded agreements with the Waldensians, the Pentecostals, 
Adventists, Jews, Baptists and Lutherans. See Silvio Ferrari, The Emerging Pattern of 
Church and State in Western Europe: The Italian Model, 1995 B.Y.U. L. REV. 421, 
428–29 (1995). 
144. In this Special Issue, see Waheeda Amien & Annie Leatt 
(Dhammamegha), Legislating Religious Freedom: An Example of Muslim 
Marriages in South Africa, 29 MD. J. INT’L L. 495 (2014); see also Peter Danchin, 
The Politics of Religious Establishment: Recognition of Muslim Marriages in South 
Africa, in VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENT 165 (Lori G. Beaman & 
Winnifred Fallers Sullivan eds., 2013).  
145.  See supra notes 13–16 and accompanying text. 
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3.   Conflicts of Rights 
The final and arguably most intractable dilemma in religious 
liberty discourse arises when two or more claims of right come into 
conflict with each other. The issue here is not the conflict per se 
between M’s right to be free from racial discrimination and JFS’s 
right to discriminate in its admissions policy on the basis of religion 
and belief. We saw how the majority decided this issue by defining 
the forum internum of the right to religious liberty narrowly as 
individual belief and interpreting the RRA 1976 as a valid limitation 
on the right to manifest religion in the forum externum in order to 
protect the rights of others.146  
Rather, it is the disagreement between the concurring and 
dissenting judgments on the question of indirect racial discrimination 
that exposes a genuine conflict of rights internal to the right to 
religious liberty itself. The need to justify issues of legitimate aim 
and proportionate means of achieving that aim opened the 
deliberative space for claims to religious liberty to be advanced, 
albeit indirectly, by both M and JFS as reasons either to permit or 
prohibit the adverse impact of the school’s admissions policy on M 
and E (and other children not of Jewish ethnic origin in the maternal 
line).147  
What was striking is the disagreement between the concurring 
and dissenting judgments in interpreting the concept of 
proportionality as to whether to privilege the individual autonomy of 
M and E in matters of religion (i.e. the right to choose conversion 
under the authority of a non-Orthodox (Masorti) rabbinate) or the 
collective autonomy of JFS and the OCR to determine their own rules 
of religious membership. For the concurrence, JFS was found to have 
failed to consider whether admitting children recognized as Jewish by 
any of the branches of Judaism would undermine the religious ethos 
of the school. Having found at the first stage of analysis that the OCR 
was bound by and had the right to apply Orthodox Jewish religious 
law, the implicit suggestion at the second stage of analysis is that 
Orthodox rules on conversion are insufficiently pluralistic and 
inclusive and that JFS should interpret and apply these rules more 
sensitively to the values of individual freedom and choice.  
 
146. This argument is especially forcefully stated in the majority judgment of 
Lord Mance: see supra note 111 and accompanying text.  
147. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.  
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This argument does not address issues of racial or ethnic 
discrimination (recall that JFS accepted that M was “ethnically 
Jewish”) but rather substitutes the concurring judges’ conception of 
what constitutes religion and a proper religious subjectivity for that of 
JFS and the OCR. This in fact reverses the logic of their claims, 
which were premised on the notion that it is halakhah is immutable, 
while ethnicity is a social choice. It is precisely this danger of non-
neutrality and interference in matters of religious doctrine and 
practice which drives the dissenting judgments towards judicial 
abstention and deference to the normative authority of JFS and the 
OCR which, in effect, privileges the right of JFS to collective 
freedom over the individual autonomy-based claims of M and E.  
As a matter of justice, neither position seems entirely 
satisfactory. Regardless of the merits of the competing positions, the 
interesting question from the perspective of any theory of religious 
freedom is why such debates within religious communities create 
different normative claims to those between religious communities 
and the state. The idea of value pluralism allows us to see that there is 
in fact more than one substantive rights claim at issue. Because the 
right to freedom of religion is a complicated bundle of entitlements, 
each made up of a diversity of claims, it protects a range of human 
interests that are often at odds.148 If this is correct, the critical 
question is why a majority of the U.K. Supreme Court so easily and 
at times without argument privileges only one of the substantive 
rights claims at issue. Further, if both claims are to be given their due, 
how should courts resolve such conflicts? 
However approached, it is clear that the historical relationships 
between groups within particular societies and their complex 
interrelationship within the legal framework of the state are pivotal to 
any understanding of how and why conflicts raise concerns for the 
right to religious freedom. Such conflicts give rise to both moral and 
ethical questions that bear a complex relationship to different types of 
relations between individuals and groups. This is what Robert Cover 
once termed different normative worlds or paideic nomoi.149 The 
general point is that the conflicts which arose in JFS involving 
competing claims of religious freedom cannot meaningfully be 
addressed or properly understood without taking into account these 
collective dimensions of the question and the broader historical and 
inter-group context in which these forces and actors are operating. 
 
148. See generally Peter Danchin, Suspect Symbols: Value Pluralism as a 
Theory of Religious Freedom in International Law, 33 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (2008).  
149. Cover, supra note 91.  
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Paradoxically, this requires judges to turn to substantive values and 
normative positions that transcend or lie beyond the competing rights 
claims themselves. This, of course, results in a constantly contested 
and thus oscillating series of antinomies in contradiction to the 
opening premises of neutrality towards religion and universality of 
the right.  
  CONCLUSION 
The central question addressed in this Article is posed by the 
opening paragraph of Lord Phillips’ leading judgment for the 
majority. While JFS is framed and adjudicated as a race 
discrimination case involving unfair treatment by a school admissions 
board toward one of its applicants, the opinion begins neither by 
setting out the relevant criteria of antidiscrimination law nor 
explaining the relations and duties of justice owed by one party to the 
other. Rather, it begins by citing the seventh chapter of Deuteronomy, 
the fifth book of the Hebrew Bible and the Jewish Torah, locating the 
source of the matrilineal test in the “clear commandment against 
intermarriage” in the third and fourth verses which he reads to yield 
the self-evident conclusion that it is a “fundamental tenet of the 
Jewish religion … that the child of a Jewish mother is automatically 
and inalienably Jewish.” 
A genuine ambiguity is thus presented at the outset regarding 
who is on trial before the Court: is it JFS, for its treatment of M; or 
the ancient Israelite religion and its offspring, Judaism? This in turn 
generates deeper and deeply opposing anxieties. If the Court is to 
permit discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity or descent solely 
because authorized by a religious tradition or justified on religious 
grounds, does this not pose a threat to the very foundations and 
conditions of our contemporary secularity and freedom? Conversely, 
if the Court is to prohibit such a long-standing practice internal to a 
religious tradition which entangles religious and descent-based 
criteria, does this not threaten the very idea of religious freedom 
which has long been understood to encompass the right of religious 
persons, groups and institutions to determine their own rules of 
belief, identity and membership free of state interference and 
regulation.  
As the reasoning in the majority, concurring and dissenting 
judgments unfolds, we see the antinomies and contradictions 
characteristic of religious freedom discourse as the fundamental 
liberal premises of state neutrality towards religion and universality 
of the right to religious liberty are continually entangled with and 
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defined in terms of their opposites. This is seen equally in the 
arguments adduced by the parties. Having first claimed to be bound 
by immutable religious law, JFS and the OCR paradoxically invoke 
the right as a matter of religious freedom to decide for themselves 
matters of religious doctrine and orthodoxy. Conversely, having 
claimed the right to be free from racial and ethnic discrimination and 
to practice their religion freely, M and his parents paradoxically rely 
on a distinctly modern conception of religion understood in terms of 
individual belief regarded as freely chosen to apply to a modern 
Orthodox Jewish faith-school. 
But it is the divergences in reasoning in and across the nine 
separate judgments that best illustrate the modern politics of religious 
freedom. In contrast to his opening reference to Deuteronomy, Lord 
Phillip thereafter steadfastly claims no interest in any religious 
rationale for JFS’s actions: the Court will rule on the facts alone, not 
on the basis of any “religious” motivation or reason. But in arriving 
at this judgment, the majority draws a strong distinction between 
racial and religious grounds for exclusion implicitly thereby 
embracing a specific conception of religion as a non-racial category 
which itself is authorized by a prior understanding of the essential 
nature of religion in terms of interiorized belief.  
The distinctive bifurcation of the modern right to religious 
liberty between a forum internum of sovereign individual belief and a 
forum externum of manifestation of that belief open to limitation and 
regulation is in this way mapped and encoded into the logic of 
antidiscrimination law: to discriminate for any reason (religious or 
not) on the ground of an immutable characteristic such as race, 
ethnicity or descent is axiomatically unjust because it irrationally 
denies the personal autonomy and valuable choices of others. In this 
moral economy, religion properly understood is reduced to a state of 
mind – belief in a set of creedal propositions to which a legal subject 
voluntarily assents – which is “individual and otherworldly” rather 
than constituting “any form of activity in the world.”  
This Article has shown both how Judaism does not fit into these 
legal categories and contests this conception of immutable 
characteristics and valuable choices. For JFS and the OCR, the 
relevant immutable characteristic is religious as constituted by Jewish 
religious law (halakhah) while it is ethnicity which is a matter of 
social choice. Indeed, it was central to OCR’s submissions before the 
Court that one could be Jewish according to religious law while 
explicitly rejecting any conscious affiliation with the Jewish religion 
or faith. The veracity and rationality of these positions are reflected in 
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the reasoning of the concurring and dissenting judgments taken 
together. These judgments reject the majority’s interpretation of the 
distinction between racial and religious grounds finding not only that 
the religious motivations and reasons for the exclusionary actions of 
JFS are relevant to the determination of this question but that the 
exclusion of M was made on religious grounds as required by 
Orthodox religious Jewish law.  
This yields the first major divergence in reasoning in the case. In 
contrast to the majority’s external, volitional and subjective stance 
towards Judaism and the obligation to comply with halakhah, the 
concurring judgments adopt an internal, cognitive and objective point 
of viewing in adjudicating the first level question of the distinction 
between racial and religious grounds. This opens the conceptual 
space for a different form of contestation as the exclusion of M is 
now adjudicated at the secondary level of indirect racial 
discrimination allowing JFS and the OCR to seek to justify the 
reasonableness of their actions towards M.  
This, in turn, yields the second major divergence in reasoning in 
the case. In contrast to the cognitivist conception of religion adopted 
by the concurrence (albeit with its recognition of the objectivity of 
reasons and obligations deriving from a different source), the 
dissenting judgments respond to and are more sensitive to a 
conception of Judaism as a living discursive tradition which 
encompasses a way of life with its own established and internally 
contested sources, justifications and hermeneutics and thus its own 
conceptions of religious identity, authority, membership and practice. 
It is this recognition that underlies the dissent’s reliance on more 
classical liberal ideas of negative liberty and judicial abstention 
which at the same time fail to take seriously or engage with the 
individual harm suffered by M as a result of the exclusionary actions 
of JFS and the OCR. 
Only the concurring judgments of Lord Hope and Lord Walker 
squarely address this issue seeking to balance the conflicting claims 
of right of both JFS and M using concepts common to 
antidiscrimination and human rights law of legitimate aim and 
proportionate means. Implicit in this analysis is an assessment of the 
harms imposed by JFS’s admissions policy on the valuable life 
choices and autonomy of M and his parents. Importantly, this is held 
to include their right to choose among Orthodox, Masorti, Reform 
and Liberal branches of Judaism which the concurrence implicitly 
weighs more heavily than the (collective) right of JFS to devise its 
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own admissions policy and follow the advice of the OCR in basing 
criteria for membership on Orthodox Jewish religious law.  
In doing so, the reasoning in the concurring judgments implicitly 
makes an assessment of the reasonableness not of the matrilineal test 
(which, unlike the majority, is found to be rational) but of the 
application by JFS towards M of Orthodox conversion criteria which 
is found to be insufficiently inclusive and pluralistic. In this sequence 
of legal maneuvers, the question of indirect racial discrimination 
based on immutable characteristics is subtly transformed into a 
reason-based jurisprudence premised on liberal criteria and 
fundamental values of individual freedom and autonomy. When this 
reasoning is considered alongside that of the majority, we see how 
Judaism is in fact indicted twice: first categorically by the majority in 
the forum internum for irrationally prescribing an immutable 
characteristic as part of the matrilineal descent test, and second by the 
concurrence in the forum externum for unreasonably denying the 
valuable choices of M and his parents regarding religion, a judgment 
which also implicitly scrutinizes and is suspicious of beliefs and 
doctrines internal to the forum internum of the Jewish religion.150 
In response to the Court’s ruling that Orthodox Judaism’s 
membership and conversion criteria were unlawful for use in its 
admissions policy, JFS amended the policy to accept students on the 
basis of a “Certificate of Religious Practice” which gauges 
synagogue attendance, formal Jewish education and community 
participation.151 This change in policy has removed the ability to 
accept children on the basis of the OCR’s definition of Jewish 
membership criteria and substituted it with a state-supervised policy 
of religious practice which is non-discriminatory, cross-
denominational and free of reference to ethnic or decent-based 
criteria. The school remains a faith-based school but if it employs 
Orthodox halakhah as its grounds for admission, it transgresses the 
boundaries of state law.  
 
150. The separation between private, inner belief and public, outer act or 
expression is in fact “reunited through a suspicion of motives of material interest or 
worldly power. In the context of the freedom of religious belief, it becomes 
imperative to determine whether acts or expressions of belief are genuinely 
religiously motivated. This presumes the power to pronounce upon, and if 
necessary probe into, the character of one’s private convictions.” Agrama, supra 
note 136. There is accordingly a sense in the concurring judgments that JFS and 
OCR are exercising their institutional authority on the issue of conversion in a way 
that is not entirely or genuinely religiously motivated. 
151. Certificate of Religious Observance, JFS SCHOOL, http://www.jfs.brent.s 
ch.uk/sites/default/files/attachments/11%2B%20CRP%202015.pdf [2014]. 
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The JFS case thus finally illustrates the distinctive modalities of 
the exercise of modern secular power. In defining the meaning, 
scope, and dialectical relationship between the public sphere and 
individual rights, the Court regulates and delimits what constitutes 
religion and a proper religious subjectivity as a matter of English law. 
This raises considerable anxieties amongst the judges themselves as 
the extent of intrusion of state law into the forum internum of the 
Jewish religion becomes visible whether axiomatically as a matter of 
direct discrimination or pursuant to the balancing of rights and 
interpretation of proportionality as a matter of indirect discrimination. 
In this complex set of moves, we see how the concept of 
neutrality towards Judaism is defined in terms of the right to religious 
liberty which, in turn, is defined in terms of competing conceptions 
of neutrality as the majority, concurring and dissenting judgments 
each grapple with the implications of state authority vis-a-vis a 
competing normative system. The right to religious liberty is in this 
sense best viewed as a sophisticated technology of modern secular 
power which operates to discipline actually-existing religious 
traditions so they conform to those secular spaces and sensibilities 
religion properly should inhabit and express. 
